PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AS RELIEF
FOR SUBSTANTIAL PROCEDURAL
VIOLATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES: AMOCO PRODUCTION CO. V
VILLAGE OF GAMBELL
I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) permits federal courts to
issue preliminary injunctions. The rule, however, specifies neither the
purpose of nor the conditions necessary for granting such injunctive
relief. Instead, the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is left to
the trial court's discretion, which is guided by historic principles of
equity.1 Pursuant to these principles, courts generally do not issue injunctive relief unless a remedy at law is inadequate2 and an injunction
is necessary to preserve or restore the status quo. 3 More specifically,
in determining whether to issue injunctive relief, the courts typically
invoke the traditional test, which requires the balancing of four factors: (1) whether the petitioner has demonstrated probable success on
the merits; (2) whether the petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if
injunctive relief is denied; (3) whether such harm will outweigh any
injury that the respondent will suffer if injunctive relief is granted; and
(4) whether granting injunctive relief will best serve the public interest. 4 Although no standardized formula exists, 5 it is clear that a party
Copyright © 1987 by Alaska Law Review
1. See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 52 (1973); Plater, Statutory Violations
and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 524, 533-45 (1982); Developments in the
Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1056-59 (1965).
2. D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 108; 11 C. WRIGHT & A.

MILLER, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2944, at 392 (1973) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
3. 7 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & K. SINCLAIR, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
§ 65.04[1] (2d ed. 1986); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2947, at 423, § 2948, at
463-64.
4. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2948, at 430-3 1. Some courts also invoke

an alternative test and issue preliminary injunctive relief when the moving party has
proven either: (1) a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable
injury; or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships favors

injunctive relief. See, e.g., United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1986);
City of Tenakee Springs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1402, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985); cf Sierra Club
v. Hennessy, 695 F.2d 643, 647 (2d Cir. 1982) (similar test but explicitly requires
irreparable harm in (2)).
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seeking a preliminary injunction in the federal courts must, at a minimum, demonstrate "irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal
'6
remedies."
The federal courts' discretion to grant or deny preliminary injunctive relief is not sacred; Congress can "intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts' discretion."' 7 The degree to which a
statute limits or restricts the courts' discretion depends on the intent of
Congress and the nature of the statute. Consequently, when federal
courts are faced with a question of whether to grant or deny a prelimi-

nary injunction for an alleged statutory violation, they must consider
Congress' mandate in conjunction with their historical imperative to
balance the equities. The weight to be accorded each of these factors
is a matter with which federal courts8 and legal scholars have
struggled. 9
5. Professor Leubsdorf, in his analysis of the historical development of preliminary injunctive relief, provides an illustrative discussion of the lack of standards upon
which injunctive relief is granted and proposes a standardized model that courts
should adopt. See Leubsdorf, The Standardfor PreliminaryInjunctions, 91 HARV. L.
RFv. 525, 541-44 (1978).
6. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
7. Id. at 313 (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
8. See infra notes 17-68, 126-30, 134-224 and accompanying text.
9. There are several important discussions of the courts' ability to balance the
equities when faced with a statutory violation. See, e.g., Farber, EquitableDiscretion,
Legal Duties,and EnvironmentalInjunctions, 45 U. Prrr. L. Ruv. 513 (1984); Plater,
supra note 1; Winner, The Chancellor'sFoot and EnvironmentalLaw: A Callfor Better Reasoned Decisions on EnvironmentalInjunctions, 9 ENVTL L. 477, 506-10 (1979).
This note differs from these articles in several important ways. First, unlike Professor Plater's article, this note neither provides an historical analysis of the courts'
equitable powers vis-A-vis statutory mandates, see Plater, supra note 1, at 545-83, nor
attempts to find that statutes, regardless of their nature - procedural, substantive, or
some variation thereof - similarly affect the courts' ability to balance the equities, id.
at 526-33. The Court's decision in Romero-Barcelo,456 U.S. 305, does not conform to
Professor Plater's model. See Plater, supra note 1, at 593-94. This note suggests that
the nature of the statute determines the restrictions, if any, on the courts' ability to
balance the equities, and thus accounts for Romero-Barcelo. Second, this note expands upon Professor Farber's assertion that congressional intent is the key determinant of whether and to what extent a statute affects the courts' ability to balance the
equities in a case involving a statutory violation. Specifically, this note concerns "ancillary injunctions" (injunctive relief for a violation of a procedural statute) as defined
by Professor Farber, supra, at 539-40. Professor Farber concludes that courts have
discretion to grant or deny ancillary injunctions, id. at 540, and this note analyzes the
scope of this discretion. Finally, this note expands on Professor Winner's analysis of
the courts' role under NEPA and disagrees with his conclusion that NEPA should
affect the weighting of the balancing calculus rather than provide a presumption
favoring injunctive relief. Winner, supra, at 506-10. See also Plater, supra note 1, at
574-75 (criticizing Professor Winner's conclusion that balancing is appropriate).
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Recently the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell.10 This case once again
presents the Court with the question of whether and to what extent a
statute-here the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act,
Title VIII ("ANILCA")' '-affects the courts' discretion to grant or
12
deny a preliminary injunction as relief for a statutory violation.
ANILCA, however, presents the Court with a novel issue because the
statute is procedural, not substantive, in nature.13 Moreover, the procedures are not merely secondary; rather they are the essence of the
statute. Although much of the Court's decision should be based on
the language of ANILCA and its legislative history, the Court must
also consider the procedural nature of the statute. The impact of the
decision, therefore, will not be limited to preliminary-injunction actions under ANILCA, but will influence such actions involving procedural violations of similar statutes, particularly the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1970 ("NEPA"), Title 1.14
This note first discusses several United States Supreme Court decisions concerning whether a particular statute restricts a federal
court's ability to invoke its equitable powers to grant or deny a preliminary injunction for a violation of the statute. Second, the note summarizes Amoco. Third, it compares and contrasts ANILCA with the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA") 1 5 and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") 16 (each considered in earlier Supreme
Court cases), and concludes that the courts' discretion to grant or
deny injunctive relief for a probable substantial procedural violation of
10. 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986).
11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3111-3126 (1982). "ANILCA" as used in this note only refers
to Subchapter II-Subsistence Management and Use, sections 801-16 of the Act.
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (I), Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell,
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986) (Federal Petitioners); see also infra notes 68-69
and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 72-102 and accompanying text; see also Village of Gambell v.
Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414, 1421 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. grantedsub nom. Amoco Prod. Co.
v. Village of Gambell, 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986); Village of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d
572, 582 (9th Cir. 1984); Kunaknana v. Clark, 742 F.2d 1145, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1984)
(court construed section 810 of ANILCA to provide a "procedural mechanism which
insures ... local input into the administrative decision-making process").
Although this issue has been before the Court in several cases involving the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the Court has never reached the issue
for, in each instance, it found that the federal action involved did not violate section
102(2)(C) of the Act. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444
U.S. 223 (1980); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-35 (1982). For the pertinent language of NEPA and a
discussion of NEPA's similarity to ANILCA, see infra notes 132-33.
15. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
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ANILCA is severely limited. Finally, drawing upon an analysis of
preliminary injunction litigation under NEPA, this note concludes
that ANILCA and other procedural statutes should be construed to
require courts to invoke the following three-factor test rather than the
traditional test. First, probable success on the merits should be established by demonstrating the probable substantial violation of the statute's nondiscretionary procedures-procedures that are not merely
secondary, but are the essence of the statute. Second, irreparable
harm should not depend on a showing that the plaintiff is actually
harmed (for example, that subsistence uses (ANILCA) or the environment (NEPA) will be irreparably harmed); instead, irreparable harm
should lie in the procedural harm, that is, in the failure to comply with
the rural participation requirements of section 810 of ANILCA or the
failure to prepare an adequate environmental impact statement
("EIS") under section 102(2)(C) of NEPA. Third, public interest
should not be left to the determination of the court, but should be
regarded as defined by the statute and, therefore, embodied in its procedural requirements. Thus, upon a showing of a probable substantial
violation of a procedural statute, a rebuttable presumption of injunctive relief should arise. This presumption may be defeated by showing
that unusual circumstances exist, the violation is technical rather than
substantial, or the issuance of injunctive relief is unnecessary to ensure
procedural compliance.
II.

STATUTORY EFFECT ON THE COURTS'
EQUITABLE DISCRETION

Whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is historically
founded in the courts' equitable discretion.17 Congress, however, has
the authority to "guide or control" the courts in the exercise of their
discretion. Is But, Congress' ability to do so is restricted in two important ways. First, Congress must clearly express its intent to limit the
courts' discretion. As the Court stated in Porter v. Warner Holding
19
Co.:
[T]he comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be
denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and
inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the
full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. "The
great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should
not be
'20
yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction."
17. See supra note I and accompanying text.
18. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (citing Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944)).
19. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
20. Id. at 398 (quoting Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 (1836)).
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Second, even where Congress clearly intends to limit the courts' discretion, the Court has held that "a federal judge sitting as a chancellor
is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation
of law."'2 1 For example, in Hecht Co. v. Bowles,22 despite a past statutory violation by the defendant, the Court denied injunctive relief because the district court concluded that "the issuance of an injunction
would have 'no effect by way of insuring better compliance in the future' and would be 'unjust' to [Hecht Co.] and not 'in the public

interest.'

"23

While Congress is constrained in the extent to which it can limit
the courts' equitable discretion, the courts too are limited in their ability to narrow the impact of Congress' intent.24 This inherent limitation is founded in our tripartite governmental system. 25 As the Court
in Hill explained, "the commitment to the separation of powers is too
fundamental for [the courts] to pre-empt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the public
weal.' "26 The courts can limit the effect of a statute on their equitable
discretion only insofar as their interpretation contradicts neither the
allow otherwise would violanguage of a statute nor its purpose. To
27
late the separation of powers doctrine.
The Supreme Court has applied these conflicting principles in a
number of cases presenting the issue of whether it was appropriate for
the lower federal courts to balance the equities, notwithstanding a
clear statutory violation. The Court's decisions, while varying in result,2 8 consistently reveal the paramount importance of the "language,
21. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978).
22. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
23. Id. at 326 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 49 F. Supp. 528, 532 (D. D.C.
1943)). The Court interpreted section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942 to provide courts with discretion in determining what relief was appropriate for a
statutory violation. The Court explained that section 205(a), although requiring that
relief "shall" be granted upon a showing of actual or probable violation, explicitly
permitted the grant of a "permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or
other order." Id. at 322 (quoting section 205(a)). The Court opined that the inclusion
of the words "or other order" coupled with the statute's legislative history did not
require courts to issue a mandatory injunction when there was an actual or probable
violation. Id. at 328.
24. See infra notes 38-40, 115, 119-31 and accompanying text.
25. Hill, 437 U.S. at 194-95.
26. Id. at 195.
27. See infra notes 38-40, 115, 119-31 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (despite statutory violation, balancing of equities required and injunctive relief denied), discussed
infra notes 41-51 and accompanying text; Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (injunctive relief granted
without balancing the equities after finding a statutory violation), discussed infra notes
33-40 and accompanying text; Porter,328 U.S. 395, 399 (1946) (reversed lower court's
decision to grant injunctive relief and deny restitution because section 205(a) of the
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history, and structure of the legislation under review."' 29 As Professor
Plater demonstrates, however, "there have been many statutory equity
cases in which judges have exercised discretion, but never [with the
one exception being Romero-Barcelo] so as to override the specific
prohibitions of a statute." 30 Specifically, the Court's decisions reveal
that in reviewing the statute involved it makes three inquiries. First,
does the statutory scheme, its language, and the legislative history
demonstrate that Congress intended the courts to exercise their discretion as to the appropriate remedy for a statutory violation? Second,
does the violation undermine the statutory scheme and its underlying
purpose? Third, do the circumstances warrant injunctive relief, that
is, will injunctive relief redress the harm incurred and ensure future
statutory compliance?
The Court's decisions in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo31 and
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill32 illustrate its reasoning process and
the scope of its holdings. Furthermore, both are probative as to the
resolution of Amoco. In Hill, the Court was confronted with the question of whether ESA required the lower federal court to enjoin the
completion of the Tellico Dam because its operation would eradicate
the snail darter, an endangered species. 3 3 The district court, after balancing the equities, found that the issuance of a permanent injunction
would mean abandoning the project, and thus $53 million of the $78
million expended would be wasted. 34 It, therefore, denied the injunctive relief requested. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
finding that the funds congressionally authorized and spent on the
project were immaterial because "the only relevant legislation was the
Act itself, 'the meaning and spirit' of which was 'clear on its face.' ,,35
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. App. § 925(a) (1946) (terminated
1947)), permitted the district courts to invoke their equitable discretion in determining
whether to issue a "permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other
order"); Hecht Co., 321 U.S. 321 (Court denied injunctive relief despite past violation
of section 205(a) Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. App. § 925(a)
(Supp. 11 1942) (terminated 1947)), discussed supra note 22 and accompanying text;
United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940) (in reinstating injunctive relief issued by the district court, the Supreme Court explained that
"this case does not call for a balancing of equities or for the invocation of the generalities of judicial maxims in order to determine whether an injunction should have
issued").
29. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978); accord Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 314-19.
30. Plater, supra note 1, at 594.
31. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
32. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
33. Id. at 156.
34. Id. at 166 (citing Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 419 F. Supp. 753, 758 (E.D.
Tenn. 1976)).
35. Id. at 169 (quoting Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064, 1072 (6th
Cir. 1977)).
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The Supreme Court reviewed the statute and its legislative history and
found that "Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the
highest of priorities" 36 and "[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting
this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost."'37 It, therefore, affirmed the appellate court's decision. Although noting that "the balancing of equities and hardships is
appropriate in almost any case as a guide to the chancellor's discretion, ' ' 38 the Court reasoned that:
[T]hese principles take a court only so far. Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each branch having certain
defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. While "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is," it is equally-and emphatically-the exclusive
province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies
and mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation....
Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it
...
abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby adopting a
policy which it described as "institutionalized caution."...
. . Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its
is determined, the judicial process comes to an
constitutionality
39
end.
Hence, the Court held that, although it could not mechanically grant
injunctive relief under the statute, Congress had already balanced the
4°
equities and, therefore, the Court's discretion was severely restricted.
In Romero-Barcelo, the Supreme Court's most recent decision
concerning the effect of a statute on the courts' equitable discretion,
the Court was confronted with the issue of whether the Navy should
be enjoined from discharging ordnances into the waters surrounding
an island off the coast of Puerto Rico. The Navy's action violated the
FWPCA because it had failed to secure a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") as required under the Act. The
district court, after balancing the equities, denied injunctive relief. It
reasoned that, because the discharges were not harming the environment and because the training that occurred on and around the island
was important, "the granting of the injunctive relief sought would
cause grievous, and perhaps irreparable harm, not only to Defendant
*

36. Id. at 174.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 184.
Id. at 193 (quoting D. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 52).
Id. at 194 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
Id. at 194-95.
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Navy, but to the general welfare of this Nation."'4 1 The court, however, ordered the Navy to apply for a National Pollution Discharge
42
Elimination System permit.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Hill, vacated the
district court's order and remanded the case, ordering the court to
enjoin the Navy from further discharges until it secured a permit. The
court of appeals found that "[w]hether or not the Navy's activities in
fact harm the coastal waters, it has an absolute statutory obligation to
stop any discharges of pollutants until the permit procedure has been
followed and the Administrator of the EPA, upon review of the evi'43
dence, has granted a permit."
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, relying on Hecht and
distinguishing Hill. The Court explained that:
[A] major departure from the long tradition of equity practice
should not lightly be implied. As we did [in Hecht], we construe the
statute at issue "in favor of that interpretation which affords a full
opportunity for equity courts to treat enforcement proceedings...
in accordance with their traditional practices, as conditioned by the
necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to protect." We do not read the FWPCA as foreclosing completely the
exercise of the court's discretion. Rather than requiring a district
court to issue an injunction for any and all statutory violations, the
FWPCA permits the district court to order that relief it considers
necessary to secure prompt compliance with the Act. That relief
44
can include, but is not limited to, an order of immediate cessation.
In so holding, the Court distinguished Hill on several grounds.
First, in Hill "[tihe purpose and language of [ESA] limited the remedies available to the District Court; only an injunction could vindicate
the objectives of the Act,"' 45 whereas in the instant case "[a]n injunction [was] not the only means of ensuring compliance. The FWPCA
itself, for example, provides for fines and criminal penalties."'4 6 Second, the statutory violation presented in Hill went to the heart of ESA.
In contrast, violating the permit process of the FWPCA did not undermine the statute as the Secretary asserted because:
[t]he integrity of the Nation's waters, however, not the permit process, is the purpose of the FWPCA. As Congress explained, the
41. Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 707 (D. P.R. 1979), aff'd in part and
vacated in part sub nom. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1981),
rev'd, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
42. Id. at 708.
43. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 861 (1st Cir. 1981), rev'd, 456 U.S.
305 (1982).
44. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320 (quoting Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 330).
45. Id. at 314.
46. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), (d) (1982)).
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objective of the FWPCA is to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."
This purpose is to be achieved by compliance with the Act,
including compliance with the permit requirements. Here, however, the discharge of ordnance had not polluted the waters, and,
although the District Court declined to enjoin the discharges, it
neither ignored the statutory violation nor undercut the purpose
and function of the permit system. The court ordered the Navy to
apply for a permit. It temporarily, not permanently, allowed the
Navy to continue its activities without a permit.47

Third, the Court found that the FWPCA's "statutory scheme contemplates equitable consideration, '4 8 and "Congress envisioned, rather
than curtailed, the exercise of discretion."' 49 It based this finding on
the existence of a "scheme of phased compliance," 50 the nature of the
permit process which allowed some discharge of pollutants, and the
fact that the FWPCA did not require the EPA Administrator to en51
join immediately all discharges found to be in violation of the Act.
For these reasons, the Court concluded that the FWPCA and ESA
were dissimilar. Consequently, it was appropriate for the district
court to balance the equities and to conclude that the statutory violation did not warrant injunctive relief.
Hill and Romero-Barcelo provide guidance for the lower federal
courts as they analyze the language, legislative history, and structure
of a statute to determine whether the courts can exercise their traditional equitable discretion to grant or deny preliminary injunctions for
statutory violations. The courts should forgo balancing the equities
and grant injunctive relief if: (1) the statute forecloses the courts' ability to invoke their equitable discretion as to the choice of remedy or
the circumstances for which injunctive relief is appropriate, and (2)
failure to enjoin the unauthorized activity would undermine the purposes of the statute. The federal courts, however, should invoke their
traditional equitable powers and balance the equities if: (1) the alleged
conduct violates discretionary elements of the statute, or (2) the activity does not undercut the purposes of the statute but, for example,
merely violates secondary procedures as in Romero-Barcelo.
The statutes involved in Hill and Romero-Barcelo, however, were
substantive in nature and the procedures violated in Romero-Barcelo
were secondary. Hence, the question remains whether nondiscretionary, procedural duties that constitute the essence of a statute affect the
47. Id. at 314-15 (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(1982)).
48. Id. at 318.
49. Id. at 316 (citing S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3668, 3709).
50. Id. (interpreting 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. IV 1980) (amended 1981)).
51. Id. at 316-18.
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courts' ability to balance the equities in determining whether to grant
or deny a preliminary injunction for a substantial procedural violation.
The remainder of this note will attempt to answer this question by
analyzing Amoco, ANILCA, and the lower courts' struggle with this

issue in preliminary-injunction actions involving section 102(2)(C) of
NEPA.
III. AMOCO PRODUCTION Co. v. VILLAGE OF GAMBELL
Amoco is the product of two appellate decisions arising from the
attempts of the Villages of Gambell and Stebbins to enjoin the Secretary of Interior's sale of oil and gas exploration leases located on federally-owned outer continental shelf lands in the Navarin Basin and
Norton Sound off the western coast of Alaska. 52 In support of this
action, the Villages assert, inter alia, that section 810 of ANILCA applies to the outer continental shelf outside of the territorial boundaries
of Alaska, the Secretary failed to comply with the statute's procedural
requirements protecting opportunities for subsistence uses, and, therefore, the sales should be enjoined.
The District Court for the District of Alaska, in a series of unreported decisions, refused to issue a preliminary injunction, 53 finding
that ANILCA did not extend to the outer continental shelf outside of
Alaska's territorial boundaries. 54 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
52. Specifically, the villages initially sought to enjoin Lease Sale 57, which includes 429 tracts-2.4 million acres of land-located in the Norton Sound Basin,
twenty-five miles off of the western coast of Alaska. See Village of Gambell v. Hodel,
774 F.2d 1414, 1417 (9th Cir. 1985) (Gambell I1), cert. granted sub nom. Amoco
Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986). While the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals was considering whether injunctive relief was appropriate, see Village of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1984) (Gambell 1), the Secretary
engaged in a sale of leases on Lease Sale 83, which includes approximately 37 million
acres in the Navarin Basin. Gambell I, 774 F.2d at 1418. The Navarin Basin is in the
Bering Sea, approximately 250 miles off the coast of Alaska. Id. The Village of
Gambell filed a separate action to enjoin Lease Sale 83, which the district court consolidated with the injunctive action concerning Lease Sale 57 remanded to it by the
court of appeals. Id.
53. On March 14, 1983, the district court rejected the villages' argument that
ANILCA usurped its power to "consider traditional equitable principles in determining whether an injunction should be issued once a substantial violation by a federal
official of a statute ... has occurred," Village of Gambell v. Watt, 18 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) at 2167, and invoked traditional equitable principles to deny the issuance of
preliminary injunctive relief. The court, however, believed that the villages had raised
a serious question concerning whether ANILCA applied to the outer continental shelf
outside of Alaska's territorial boundaries. Therefore, it concluded that the issue
should be resolved prior to the issuance of the leases. Id. at 2168.
54. On April 4, 1983, the district court found that Congress intended ANILCA to
apply only to lands and waters within the territorial boundaries of Alaska and that
ANILCA, therefore, did not extend to the outer continental shelf lands. Village of
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disagreed. It held that section 810 of ANILCA applies to the outer
continental shelf and remanded the matter for determination of the
proper remedy. 55
On remand, the district court found that the Secretary violated
ANILCA for two reasons. First, because "the Secretary did not have
the mandate of ANILCA clearly in mind . . . , he could not have
performed the lease sale evaluations in the manner Congress intended."' 56 Second, subsequent to Gambell I and prior to the district
court's decision, the Minerals Management Service prepared a section
810 significant restriction study for lease sale 57 in which it found,
inter alia, that the "development and production 'may significantly restrict subsistence uses in certain areas' if oil is discovered." '57 Therefore, the Secretary had a duty to comply with the procedural
requirements of section 810(a)(1)-(3). Nevertheless, the district court
denied the request for a preliminary injunction. It found that the case
presented unusual circumstances and thus held that it was appropriate
to invoke the traditional test and balance the equities. Applying this
approach, the court concluded that:
(1) Movants have established a strong likelihood of success on the
merits.
(2) The balance of irreparable harm does not favor the movants.
(3) The public interest favors continued oil exploration, for the
reason that the national interest favors OCS [outer continental
shelf] oil exploration and such exploration will not cause the type of
uses or resources, that ANILCA
harm, a restriction in subsistence
58
was designed to prevent.
In Gambell II, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's decision. First, it agreed that the villages would probably succeed on the merits of their claim that the Secretary violated
section 810(a)(1)-(3) of ANILCA. 59 It based its reversal on the fact
that the law of the Ninth Circuit required it, under the facts found, to
grant a preliminary injunction. In the Ninth Circuit, "[i]rreparable
damage is presumed when an agency fails to evaluate thoroughly the
environmental impact of a proposed action."' 60 Thus, "[ain injunction
Gambell v. Watt, No. N83-003 CIV, slip op. at 1-2 (D. Alaska Apr. 4, 1983), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 746 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1984).
55. Gambell I, 746 F.2d at 573.
56. Village of Gambell v. Hodel, No. A85-184 CIV, slip op. at 5 (D. Alaska May
23, 1985), rev'd, 774 F.2d 1414 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. grantedsub nom. Amoco Prod.
Co. v. Village of Gambell, 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986).
57. Id. at 8 (quoting ANILCA section 810 significant restriction study).
58. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
59. Gambell 1, 774 F.2d 1414, 1421 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom.
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986).
60. Id. at 1423 (quoting Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th

Cir. 1984)).
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is the appropriate remedy for a substantive [sic] procedural violation
of an environmental statute, ' 6 1 unless there exist "rare or unusual circumstances.16 2 Such circumstances, the court held, were not present
in this case. In fact, the court stated that "the Secretary's lease sale
plan poses the type of danger to the subsistence culture of Alaskan
63
Natives that moved Congress to enact section 810(a) of [ANILCA]."
Consequently, the court held that "the district court erred in finding
that this is the type of rare or unusual case that justifies the denial of a
preliminary injunction in the face of its conclusion that there is a
strong likelihood of success on the merits." e In addition, the court
disagreed that the public interest favored continued oil exploration in
the area. It explained that such a finding "violates the clearly expressed Congressional intent that lease sales shall not be conducted
until the Secretary has evaluated the effect of the Oil Companies' activities on the subsistence uses and needs
of Native Alaskans.16 5 To66
gether, these errors compelled reversal.
In so holding, the appellate court rejected the Secretary's contention that Romero-Barcelo required it to affirm the district court's decision. Distinguishing ANILCA from the FWPCA, the court
analogized ANILCA to ESA for the violation of which the Supreme
Court required issuance of injunctive relief in Hill. The court
explained:
Unlike the FWPCA, the injunctive relief we grant is the only means
of insuring compliance under section 810.
It appears to us that in enacting section 810, Congress has chosen the protection of subsistence life over oil exploration. Thus,
only the issuance of a preliminary injunction to compel compliance
61. Id. at 1422. The court cites Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.
1985), but in Thomas the court used the term "substantial" rather than "substantive."
Id. at 764.
62. Gambell II, 774 F.2d at 1423 (citing Thomas, 753 F.2d at 764; Alpine Lakes
Protection Soc'y v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1975)). The petitioners
for certiorari in Amoco erroneously characterize the Ninth Circuit's rule as a "per se"
rule requiring the mechanical grant of injunctive relief. Brief for Petitioners at 42-46,
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986); see also
Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 20-21, Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell,
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986). Instead, the rule recognizes that a rebuttable
presumption for injunctive relief arises upon the showing of, or probable showing of, a
substantial procedural violation of a statute of which the procedures are its essence.
Hence, if the presumption is defeated, then either balancing the equities is appropriate
or injunctive relief should be denied. See infra notes 136-51 and accompanying text.
63. Gambell II, 774 F.2d at 1424.
64. Id. at 1425.
65. Id. at 1426 (emphasis in original).
66. Id. at 1428.
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with the requirements of section 810 can uphold Congressional intent. "Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided
the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought." 67
On June 2, 1986, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. One of
the issues before the Court is: "[w]hether the Ninth Circuit's rule that
a district Court must enter a preliminary injunction whenever it finds
a likely violation of an environmental statute, unless the injunction
itself would cause environmental harm, conflicts with [RomeroBarcelo] and decisions from other circuits that require balancing of the
equities." ' 68 Oral arguments were heard on January 12, 1987, and a
decision is pending. Although it is possible that the case will be decided on other grounds, 69 if the Court decides this issue, it will have to
consider ANILCA and its legislative history in light of its earlier
decisions.

IV. ANILCA

RESTRICTS THE COURTS' EQUITABLE DISCRETION
TO GRANT OR DENY A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

70
ANILCA Subehapter II - Subsistence Management and Use,
71
'
of which section 810 is a part, is a "procedural scheme,
designed to
"provide the opportunity for rural residents engaged in a subsistence
way of life to do so. ' '72 Although the question of whether a statute

67. Id. at 1426 n.2 (quoting Hill, 437 U.S. at 194).
68. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (I), Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell,
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986) (Federal Petitioners).
69. Amoco presents the Court with three additional issues, which may enable it to
decide the case on grounds other than the preliminary injunction issue. These include:
(2) Whether Section 810 of [ANILCA], which requires federal land
managers to determine whether proposed dispositions of public lands in
Alaska "would significantly restrict subsistence uses" and, if so, to follow
certain procedures and make certain findings prior to any such disposition,
applies to the outer continental shelf (OCS), when the Act defines "public
lands" as lands "the title to which is in the United States" and which are in
"Alaska."
(3) Whether the court of appeals' ruling that neither OCS leasing nor
exploration may proceed until the Secretary of the Interior complies with
Section 810's procedural requirements for all stages of the OCS program,
including development and production, conflict with Secretary of Interior v.
California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
(4) Whether the court of appeals' decision applying ANILCA to the
OCS should be given retroactive effect, thereby casting a cloud over more
than 600 previously-issued OCS leases and $4.2 billion in bonus bids received by the Treasury for those leases.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (I), Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986) (Federal Petitioners).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 3120 (1982).
71. Kunaknana v. Clark, 742 F.2d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 1984).
72. 16 U.S.C. § 3112 (1982).
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affects the courts' discretion in granting or denying a preliminary injunction is a familiar one for the Court, the Court has yet to confront
this issue in the context of a statute that is procedural in nature. The
Court's decisions in Hill and Romero-Barcelo reveal how the statute
and its legislative history should be construed to determine its impact
on the courts' equitable powers to grant or deny preliminary injunctions. A comparison of ANILCA to the FWPCA and ESA demonstrates that Congress intended ANILCA to restrict the courts' ability
to invoke their discretion in granting or denying preliminary injunctive relief. Indeed, the federal government's tripartite structure commands this result.
A.

ANILCA Compared with the FWPCA and ESA
1. ANILCA Compared with the FWPCA. An analysis of
ANILCA and its legislative history reveals several factors that distinguish ANILCA from the FWPCA and, thus, Amoco from RomeroBarcelo. First, the importance of ANILCA's procedural structure visi-vis the Act's purpose is significant because, unlike the FWPCA in
which the procedural requirements are secondary to achieving pollution free waters, 73 ANILCA's procedural scheme is its essence. The
importance of this distinction is explained by the First Circuit Court
of Appeals in Massachusetts v. Watt 74 - a decision interpreting
NEPA. In affirming the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction for a probable violation of section 102(2)(C), the appellate
court reasoned that:
NEPA is not designed to prevent all possible harm to the environment .... Rather, NEPA is designed to influence the decisionmaking process .... Thus, when a decision to which NEPA obligations
attach is made without the informed environmental consideration
that NEPA requires, the harm that NEPA intends to prevent has
been suffered. NEPA in this sense differs75 from substantive environmental statutes, such as the [FWPCA].
Second, the method that Congress chose to implement and to ensure
compliance with ANILCA's procedural scheme accentuates the difference between ANILCA and the FWPCA. Unlike the FWPCA,
73. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314 (1982).
74. 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983).
75. Id. at 952 (citation omitted); accord Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[T]he harm with which the
courts must be concerned in NEPA cases is not... harm to the environment, but
rather the failure of decision-makers to take environmental factors into account in the
way that NEPA mandates."); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1972).
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ANILCA is action 77demanding, 76 and compliance is mandatory rather
than discretionary.
Together, these distinctions are crucial. Congress enacted
ANILCA to provide and to protect the rural Alaskans' opportunity to
consider the effects of proposed federal action on their subsistence way
of life. The Act is structured to force the federal agency involved to
consider the views of the affected rural Alaskans prior to taking any
action that would "significantly restrict subsistence uses." 78 This was
the avowed purpose of ANILCA, unlike the FWPCA for which the
procedures merely serve the expressed purpose of cleaning up
America's waters. Hence, violations of ANILCA's procedures, contrary to procedural violations of the FWPCA, undermine Congress'
expressed intent. Due to the fact that under ANILCA, unlike the
FWPCA, no remedy other than a preliminary injunction against a
substantial procedural violation79 will uphold this purpose, the courts,
absent unusual circumstances,80 cannot exercise equitable discretion in
deciding whether to grant such a remedy. Congress has clearly spoken
and the courts must, because of the tripartite structure of our government, defer to and enforce Congress' mandate.
a. The importance ofANILCA's proceduralscheme vis-d-vis itspurpose. Subchapter II of ANILCA establishes a procedural structure
governing decisions affecting subsistence uses. This scheme, inter alia,
provides for the participation of rural residents in subsistence-related
decisions. Three features of the Act and its legislative history demonstrate that Congress intended that the participation of rural residents
would be essential to ANILCA's success, indeed so essential that the
procedures should be considered its very purpose. First, Congress
76. ANILCA's procedural requirements are mandatory, requiring federal agencies to act in the manner prescribed by section 810 prior to approving any action that
will significantly affect subsistence uses. See infra notes 95-131 and accompanying
text. Hence, ANILCA's procedural scheme is similar to section 102(2)(C) of NEPA
in that both prescribe nondiscretionary procedures and are, therefore, "action forcing." Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 351 (1979), discussed infra at note 133;
accord Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976), discussed infra at note 133.
77. See infra notes 94-111, 118-28 and accompanying text.
78. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (1982).
79. Procedural violations that are merely technical do not warrant injunctive relief. See infra notes 140, 157-63, 194 and accompanying text.
80. Unusual circumstances exist where a competing public interest warrants that
the court balance the traditional equities. This exception is limited to situations where
the issuance of injunctive relief will undermine the purposes of the Act in question.
For example, the court may deny injunctive relief when such relief will restrict, rather
than provide or protect, the opportunity for subsistence uses, or when an injunction
would harm a countervailing public interest embodied in a competing Act or activity.
For a complete discussion of unusual circumstances that warrant balancing, see infra
notes 137-39, 164-79, 188-91, 200 and accompanying text.
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drafted ANILCA to ensure the meaningful participation of rural Alaskans in subsistence-related decisions. Second, Congress did not intend
to protect or preserve all subsistence uses; instead, it intended to protect the "opportunity for continued subsistence uses," ' rather than
subsistence uses themselves. Third, Congress defined subsistence uses

in subjective terms.
One of the purposes for ANILCA's enactment was to rectify the
failure of the Secretary of the Interior and the State of Alaska adequately to protect subsistence uses as Congress had demanded in the

Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA").8 2 Congress chose

an administrative structure ensuring rural participation in subsistencerelated decisions as the best means to address ANCSA's failure adequately to protect subsistence uses.8 3 Congress, however, was not con-

cerned merely with providing rural residents a chance to participate in
subsistence-related decisions. Instead, it drafted the subsistence sub-

chapter to ensure that such participation was meaningful. As Congress explained in its declaration of findings:
the national interest in the... continuation of the opportunity for a
subsistence way of life by residents of rural Alaska require[s] that an
administrative structure be established for the purpose of enabling
81. See 16 U.S.C. § 3111(4) (1982) (emphasis added); see also infra notes 89-91
and accompanying text.
82. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982).
83. As explained by the committees considering the bill, ANCILA represented
"the culmination of Congressional action initiated by Congress by the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act to protect and provide for continued subsistence uses by
Alaska Natives and other rural residents." S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 26768, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5070, 5211-12; accord H.R.
REP. No. 97, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 278-79 (1979).
Congressman Udall, one of the principal authors and supporters of ANILCA,
explained why the subsistence subchapter of ANILCA was necessary in light of the
fact that Congress had attempted to protect subsistence uses in ANCSA:
In 1971, the Congress, in the conference report on the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, instructed both the Secretary of the Interior and the State of
Alaska: ". . . to take any action necessary to protect the subsistence needs of

the (Alaska) Natives."
That responsibility was accepted by the Secretary and the State in exchange for the exclusion from that act of a subsistence management title
developed by the Senate.
Both the State and the Secretary have been reluctant ...

to provide

rural people with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the management and regulation of subsistence resources in their local area.
[W]e promised [Alaska's rural Native people] that we would work to
try to achieve legislation which would include a subsistence management
process to insure meaningful participation by rural people in decisions of
both the State and Federal governments which so effect [sic] their culture
and their lives ....

125 CONG. REC. 9,904 (1979) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 37, reprintedin 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2247, 2250).
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rural residents who have personal knowledge of local conditions
and requirements to have a meaningful role in the 8management
of
4
* subsistence uses on the public lands in Alaska.
The importance of this provision is evident from the fact that the
House criticized and rejected two bills
that failed to include a commit85
ment to meaningful participation.
Congress considered the right of rural residents to participate
meaningfully in decisions concerning the rate of acculturation an "important goal of correct Federal Policy."'8 6 It, therefore, included sec-

tion 805 of ANILCA, 8 7 which establishes and defines the role of
regional advisory councils. These councils, combined with the public
hearings required by section 810, provide the foundation of the management structure through which Congress chose to ensure meaningful rural participation. The House and Senate committees explained
in their reports that this section reflected their determination that:
[T]he opportunity for rural residents of Alaska with personal
knowledge of local conditions and requirements to participate effectively in the management and regulation of subsistence resources on
84. 16 U.S.C. § 3111(5) (1982) (emphasis added).
85. Congressman Grudger criticized the Breaux-Dingell bill, one of the two bills
rejected by the House, because:
regional boards established pursuant to the Breaux-Dingell bill will be totally advisory in nature, a major compromise in the commitment of this
body last year to provide rural people with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process which is critical to the survival of
their culture and subsistence way of life.
125 CONG. REc. 11,428 (1979).
The House adopted the Udall-Anderson substitute bill, see 125 CONG. REC.
11,458 (1979), which reflected a commitment to rural participation. It found that:
(12) [T]he national interest in the ...continuation of the opportunity for a
subsistence way of life by rural residents of Alaska require[s] that an administrative structure be established which enables people who have personal
knowledge of local conditions and requirements to have a meaningful role in
the.., management of subsistence uses on the public lands in Alaska.
125 CONG. REC. 11,089 (1979) (Udall-Anderson substitute bill).
86. The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs explained that:
[T]he rate at which subsistence uses and "cultural ties with a subsistence
way of life" are replaced with "aspects of the dominant non-Native culture"
properly should be determined, as far as possible, by the subsistence-dependent Native and other peoples themselves, and that protection of their option in this regard is, and rightly should be, an important goal of correct
Federal policy.
H.R. REP. No. 1045, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,at 182 (1978). Subsequent House
and Senate committee reports adopted this language. See H.R. REP. No. 97, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 230 (1979); S.REP. No. 1300, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 195
(1978).
87. 16 U.S.C. § 3115 (1982).
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the public [lands] is important in order to assure ... the ability of
rural people engaged in a subsistence lifestyle to continue to do so. 8 8

Congress, however, did not intend for ANILCA to preserve all
subsistence uses. Instead, it drafted ANILCA "to protect and provide

the opportunityfor continued subsistence uses on the public lands by
Native and non-Native rural residents."'8 9 Although the statute does

not define the "opportunity for" qualification of subsistence uses, its
meaning is reflected in ANILCA's purpose: "This act does not, however, attempt to perpetuate [subsistence] lifestyle[s] ....
Rather, the
act would merely attempt to allow the Native people to decide for
themselves the rate at which acculturation will take place." 90 Representative Udall, one of ANILCA's principal authors, further explained
88. S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 270, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
5070, 5214; H.R. REP. No. 97, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
281 (1979). Furthermore, Congress feared that the "large urban population centers
[might] dominate the regional council system and exercise control over regulation and
subsistence resources in rural areas." S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 270,
reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5070, 5124; H.R. REP. No. 97,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 281 (1979). Therefore, to ensure further that rural
participation would be "meaningful," Congress structured section 805 so that the
boundaries of regions reflected and protected "regional differences in subsistence
uses." See 16 U.S.C. § 3115(a)(1) (1982); accord S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 270, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5070, 5124; H.R.
REP. No. 97, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 281 (1979).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 3111(4) (1982) (emphasis added). Congress emphasized
ANILCA's focus on the "opportunity for subsistence uses" in its declaration of
findings:
The Congress finds and declares that(1) the continuation of the opportunityfor subsistence uses by ruCONG. & ADMIN. NEws

ral residents of Alaska ... on the public lands... is essential to Native

physical, economic, traditional, and cultural existence and to non-Native physical, economic, traditional, and social existence;
(3) continuation of the opportunity for subsistence uses of resources on public and other lands in Alaska is threatened... ;
(4) in order to fulfill the policies and purposes of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and as a matter of equity, it is necessary for
Congress to... protectand provide the opportunityfor continued subsistence uses on the public lands by Native and non-Native rural residents;
and
(5) the national interest in the... continuation of the opportunity
for a subsistence way of life by residents of rural Alaska require that an
administrative structure be established for the purpose of enabling rural
residents who have personal knowledge of local conditions and requirements to have a meaningful role in the management.., of subsistence
uses on the public lands in Alaska.
16 U.S.C. § 3111 (1982) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, in section 802, Congress declared that "the purpose of this subchapter is to provide the opportunityfor rural residents engaged in a subsistence way
of life to do so." 16 U.S.C. § 3112(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
90. H.R. REP. No. 1045, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 76 (1978).
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its scope: "[I]t is the intent of this legislation to ... leave for Alaska
Native people themselves, rather than to Federal and State resource
managers, the choice as to the direction and pace, if any, of the evolution of the subsistence way of life and of Alaska Native culture." 9 1
Finally, the manner in which Congress defined subsistence uses
further supports the view that the procedural scheme is the statute's
essence. Congress defines subsistence uses as "customary and traditional uses by rural Alaska residents of renewable resources."'92 Thus,
it chose to define subsistence uses subjectively, or, in the words of the
committees, "on a case-by-case basis to meet the needs of a particular
management situation in a particular area."' 93 Hence, to define the
subsistence use opportunity to be protected requires rural participation; only rural residents can say what is traditional or customary.
b. Implementation of and compliance with ANILCA section
810. Unlike the FWPCA, ANILCA provides for neither phased
compliance94 nor a penalty scheme dependent on the Secretary's discretion and permitting noncompliance at a price. 95 Instead, section
810 of ANILCA,96as reflected in its language and legislative history, is
"action forcing," and compliance is mandatory. Section 810 provides in part that:
(a) In determining whether to ... lease .... the head of the Federal agency ... shall evaluate the effect of such use ... on subsistence uses and needs, the availability of other lands ... and other
alternatives .... No such.., lease.., of such lands which would
significantly restrict subsistence uses shall be effected until the head
of such Federal agency(1) gives notice to the . . . local committees and regional
councils... ; [and]
(2) gives notice of, and holds, a hearing in the vicinity of the
area involved ....
(b) If the Secretary is required to prepare an environmental impact statement .... he shall provide the notice and hearing and
include the findings required by subsection (a) of this section as part
of such environmental impact statement.

91. 126 CONG. REC. 29,279-80 (1980).
92. 16 U.S.C. § 3113 (1982).
93. S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 269, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5070, 5213; H.R. REP. No. 97, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
279-80 (1979).
94. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 316 (1982).
95. Id. at 314 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), (d) (1982)).
96. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 351 (1979), discussed infra at note 135;
accord Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976), discussed infra at note 133.
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(d) After compliance with the procedural requirements of this section... the head of the appropriate Federal agency may manage or

dispose of public lands . . .97
Congress' use of "shall"9 8 and "may" in section 810 indicates that it
intended the procedural requirements of ANILCA to be nondiscretionary. 99 Congress structured section 810 so that the Secretary
"shall" first comply with the procedural scheme of ANILCA, and,
having complied with the procedures, the Secretary "may" use his discretion "to manage or dispose of the lands." It contemplated that the
Secretary would employ his discretionary powers in subsistence-related decisions 00° only after complying with the procedural scheme
Congress emplaced to "protect and provide the opportunity for subsistence uses." 101
Congress emphasized the importance of adhering to this strict
procedure by including section 816,102 which limits the Secretary's

ability to circumvent ANILCA's procedural safeguards and close public lands to subsistence uses. Only in "emergency situation[s]" where
"extraordinary measures must be taken for public safety or to assure
the continued viability of a particular fish or wildlife population...

may" the Secretary act without complying with ANILCA's notice and

public hearing requirements.10 3 Furthermore, the Secretary's unilat-

eral action is only valid for a maximum of sixty days, and the Secretary can extend this period only if, subsequent to notice and public
97. 16 U.S.C. § 3120 (1982).
98. As explained by the Supreme Court in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493
(1935), "shall" is "the language of command." Although the Court did not find the
inclusion of "shall" to be the end of the inquiry, it did hold that the presence of
"shall" is "significant," and that it is, together with the "ends and the aims" of the
statute, controlling. Id. at 493-94. Congress intended through section 810 of
ANILCA to provide the rural Alaskans an opportunity to participate in decisions
affecting subsistence uses. Absent section 810, the agencies could have listened to the
rural Alaskans had they so chosen, but they had not, as illustrated by the Secretary's
and the State's failure under ANCSA. This neglect was a major impetus for the enactment of the subchapter containing section 810. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. Thus, it is clear that Congress intended to leave the agencies no discretion
when it used "shall" in section 810. It intended to command the agencies to comply
with the procedures of section 810 prior to engaging in endeavors affecting subsistence
uses on public lands in Alaska.
99. See, e.g., Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947) (explaining that
"when the same Rule uses both 'may' and 'shall,' the normal inference is that each is
used in its usual sense-the one act being permissive, the other mandatory").
100. Congress, however, further limited the Secretary's discretion by including an
explicit preference for subsistence uses. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3112(2), 3114 (1982); see also
infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
101. 16 U.S.C. § 3111(4) (1982).
102. Id. at § 3126(b).
103. Id.
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hearing, he finds continued closure necessary. 1°4 Section 816(b) is
similar to the exemption section of ESA (section 10(b)-(d)) 10 5 and dis10 6
similar to the section of the FWPCA that permits noncompliance.
Therefore, as it did in Hill,1 0 7 the Court should apply the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alteriusto section 816(b) of ANILCA. This
construction further supports the conclusion that the procedures included in section 810 are nondiscretionary, because application of this
maxim would preclude the courts from exercising their discretion to
grant or deny injunctive relief for a procedural violation that is not
exempt under section 816(b).
Although ANILCA does not include a remedy or penalty for the
Secretary's failure to comply with its procedural requirements,10 8 it is
104. Id.
105. Id. at § 1539 (1976) (amended 1978, 1979, and 1982), discussed infra note
119.
106. Section 1323(a) of title 33 provides, inter alia, that:
The President may exempt any effluent source of any... agency ... from
compliance ... if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of the

United States to do so.... Any exemption shall be for a period not in excess
of one year, but additional exemptions may be granted for periods of not to
exceed one year upon the President's making a new determination. The
President shall report each January to the Congress all exemptions ...
granted ...

with his reasons for granting such exemption.

33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982). This exemption clause differs from section 816(b) of
ANILCA. Unlike section 816(b) of ANILCA, section 1323(a) of title 33 does not
require the President to publish reasons for granting an exemption in the Federal
Register or require public notice and participation in the exemption process. Furthermore, exemptions can be routinely renewed under section 1323(a). The Court in Romero-Barcelo narrowly construed this section. In so holding, it rejected the court of
appeals' determination that "this provision indicate[d] congressional intent to limit
the court's discretion." Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 318 (1982). Instead, because "[the Court] read the FWPCA as permitting the exercise of a court's
equitable discretion.., to order relief that will achieve compliance with the Act," id.
(emphasis in original), it concluded that the FWPCA's "exemption serves a different
and complimentary purpose, that of permitting noncompliance by federal agencies in
extraordinary circumstances." Id. (emphasis in original).
Because of its similarity in structure and operation to section 10 of ESA, see infra
note 119, and dissimilarity to section 1323(a) of title 33, section 816(b) of ANILCA
should be construed as exempting compliance rather than permitting noncompliance
in rare or emergency circumstances. Although this distinction is subtle, the Court
considers it important. As Hill andRomero-Barcelo demonstrate, a section exempting
compliance precludes the use of discretion, see infra note 119, whereas one permitting
noncompliance allows exercise of discretion.
107. 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978), discussed infra note 119.
108. Section 807 of ANILCA provides the only judicial relief Congress explicitly
included in ANILCA. See 16 U.S.C. § 3117 (1982). Section 807 applies solely to
violations of section 804 of ANILCA, id. at § 3114 (1982) (requiring a preference be
given to "nonwasteful subsistence uses" over other consumptive uses on public lands),
and state law enacted pursuant to section 805(d) of ANILCA, id. at § 3115(d) (1982)
(permitting the state to enact and implement laws consistent with 16 U.S.C. §§ 3113-
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clear from the nature of the procedures that Congress did not intend
for compliance to be a matter of the Secretary's discretion. 10 9 Representative Udall further supports this conclusion in his statement:
[R]ural residents engaged in subsistence uses... are entitled to have
the Secretary take appropriate action if the State fails to do so, and,
consequently, will be entitled to mandamus such action from the
appropriate Secretary if he should fail to fulfill his duty to manage
the public lands and the waters of Alaska in a manner consistent
with the management standards established by the Congress in this
legislation. 110
In sum, it is clear that the procedural scheme of ANILCA, which
provides the opportunity for continued subsistence uses, unlike the
permit process of the FWPCA, is the heart of the statute. The primary purpose of ANILCA is to provide rural residents who are pursuing a subsistence lifestyle with the opportunity to continue to do so.
Congress sought to do this by providing such persons the opportunity
to be heard by those proposing to engage in activity that will "significantly restrict subsistence uses." 1 1 ' Furthermore, ANILCA's implementation and compliance provisions protect this opportunity of rural
Alaskans to participate. These provisions ensure that neither the federal government nor the state government unilaterally restrict subsistence uses. Unlike the permit process of the FWPCA, compliance
with and implementation of ANILCA's procedures that protect the
opportunity for subsistence uses are mandatory and immediate. To1 12
gether, under the rules formulated by Hill and Romero-Barcelo,
these distinctions compel a result different from that reached in Romero-Barcelo. Under ANILCA, unlike under the FWPCA, a court,
absent unusual circumstances, should not exercise its equitable discretion to grant or deny a preliminary injunction as relief for a substantial
procedural violation of ANILCA.
2. ANILCA Compared with ESA. ANILCA and ESA share several characteristics that the Court in Hill considered crucial 1 3 in deciding that ESA severely limited the courts' equitable discretion to
grant or deny injunctive relief for a violation of that statute. First,
3115). When the state and Secretary are joined as defendants or when the state is the
sole defendant, section 807 grants the courts discretion to enter preliminary injunctive
relief. Furthermore, in addition to preliminary injunctive relief, in an action against a
state, courts may order the state to draft and submit regulations that comply with
section 804 of ANILCA.
109. See supra notes 82-106 and accompanying text.
110. 126 CONG. R1c. 29,280 (1980).
111. 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (1982).
112. See supra notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
113. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180-88 (1978).
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both statutes are based on a preference that Congress considered worthy of legislative protection. Second, in protecting this preference,
Congress drafted ESA and ANILCA so that each requires agencies to
comply with the nondiscretionary provisions. Together, these two
characteristics - a stated congressional preference and a mandate to
the agencies - necessitate that the courts' ability to invoke their traditional equitable discretion be severely restricted. To permit the courts
to balance the underlying equities would be to acknowledge their authority to thwart Congress' stated preference and to usurp the agencies' delegated nondiscretionary functions. The separation of powers
doctrine forbids such a result.
a. ANILCA's stated preference for subsistence uses. Both
ANILCA and ESA contain preferences. ESA expresses a preference
for the protection of endangered species over other activities that
might affect such species. 114 In deciding to uphold the grant of injunctive relief, the Hill Court reasoned that "Congress has spoken in the
plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has
been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities .... Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end." 115
ANILCA states a preference for subsistence uses over other land
and resource uses. 1 16 Although not explicitly addressing the preference of subsistence uses vis-a-vis nonconsumptive uses of public
lands," 7 Congress drafted ANILCA so that any federal agency, prior
to taking planned action, must consider the effects of such action on
114. Id. at 185 (construing section 7 of ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (amended
1978, 1979, and 1982), and its legislative history).
115. Id. at 194; see also infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
116. Sections 802(2) and 804 of ANILCA explicitly provide for preferences favoring subsistence uses over other "consumptive uses" on the public lands. Section
802(2) states that "nonwasteful subsistence uses... shall be the priority consumptive
uses of all such resources on the public lands of Alaska" and "shall be given preference on the public lands over other consumptive uses." 16 U.S.C. § 3112(2) (1982).
Section 804 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act and other Federal laws, the taking on public lands of fish and wildlife for nonwasteful subsistence
uses shall be accorded priority over the taking on such lands of fish and wildlife for
other purposes." Id. at § 3114. Congress explained:
[T]his section envisions that governmental action affecting subsistence resources and uses shall be undertaken in a manner which adequately provides
for the preference on an ongoing basis and not only when critical allocation
decisions may be necessary because a particular subsistence resource may be
threatened with depletion ....
S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 269, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5070, 5213.
117. See supra note 116.
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subsistence uses. Congress made it clear that the agencies were to accord a high priority to subsistence uses in deciding whether to permit
competing consumptive and nonconsumptive uses. 1 18
b. ANILCA and ESA are both action demanding. Both ANILCA
and ESA contain provisions commanding the agencies to act in a prescribed manner, thereby ensuring that agencies observe the preferences
embodied in the statutes.' 19 As the Court explained in Hill:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose
terms were any plainer than those in [section] 7 of [ESA]. Its very
words affirmatively command all federal agencies "to insure that
actions authorized,funded, or carriedout by them do not jeopardize
the continued existence" of an endangered species or "result in the
118. 16 U.S.C. § 3111(4) (1982).
119. Both statutes provide for limited exemptions. Section 816(b) of ANILCA exempts agencies from having to comply with ANILCA's procedural requirements only
in circumstances where "emergency situation[s]" warrant closure of public lands to
subsistence uses. 16 U.S.C. § 3126(b) (1982), discussed supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the Secretary must "publish the reasons justifying the
closure in the Federal Register," and the exemption "shall not extend for a period
exceeding sixty days, and may not be subsequently extended unless the Secretary affirmatively establishes, after notice and public hearing, that such closure should be
extended." Id.
Section 816(b) is similar to section 10 of ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1976). First, the
exemptions permitted under both Acts are narrow. Section 10(b) of ESA limits exceptions under ESA to "hardship exemptions," which are defined as those situations
where a person may suffer "undue economic hardship" because the person entered a
contract affecting a fish, wildlife, or plant species that the government subsequently
listed as an endangered species. Id. Second, each Act limits the duration of exemptions granted. Under ESA, an exemption may extend only for one year. Id. Third,
notice, publication, and public participation requirements are common to both Acts.
Section 10(c) of ESA requires the Secretary to:

publish notice in the Federal Register of each application for an exemption
.... Each notice shall invite submission from interested parties, within
thirty days after the date of the notice, written data, views, or arguments
with respect to the application; except that such thirty-day period may be
waived by the Secretary in an emergency situation where the health or life of
an endangered animal is threatened and no reasonable alternative is available to the applicant, but notice of any such waiver shall be published.., in
the Federal Register within ten days following the issuance of the
exemption....
Id. In construing the "hardship exemptions" to be an exclusive list of exemptions
from having to comply with ESA, the Court applied the maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius." Hill, 437 U.S. at 188. The Court therefore concluded that, because
the Tellico Dam did not fall within one of the exemption categories, neither the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") nor the Court could permit further construction on
the project. Because of the similarities between section 10 of ESA and section 810(b)
of ANILCA, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alteriusfurther supports the conclusion that ANILCA severely limits the courts' discretion to grant or deny injunctive
relief subsequent to a failure to comply with ANILCA unless the situation is provided
for in section 816(b).
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destruction or modification of habitat of such species...." This
language admits of no exception. 120
Hence, the Court in granting injunctive relief concluded that not only
did Congress designate a preference for endangered species, but also it
commanded the agency to uphold the balance struck in their favor.
The courts' role is therefore limited to enforcing the congressional
mandate. For the courts to act in any other manner, such as invoking
would involve ignoring the tripartite nature
their equitable discretion,
121
of our government.
ANILCA also requires the agency to make decisions in a prescribed manner 22 and to observe a preference for a specific result,
although the nature of its requirements are procedural rather than
substantive. 123 The statute and its legislative history demonstrate that
no agency action significantly affecting subsistence uses is to proceed
until the Secretary complies with ANILCA's procedures.1 24 The only
difference between this mandate and that of ESA is that in the latter
Congress struck the substantive balance, whereas with ANILCA,
Congress did not. It set forth the procedures necessary to implement
the balance
broad policy goals, thereby permitting the agency to strike125
Complibetween subsistence uses and other uses on public lands.
the conTo
not
discretionary.
is
however,
procedures,
these
with
ance
the
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that
the
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declared
unequivocally
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must
that
uses
for
subsistence
preference
and
the
follow
must
sider. Neither the agency nor the court can ignore Congress' procedural mandate so long as it is constitutional. 126 A court cannot
proceed to balance the equities because to do so would require it to
"interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the
120. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)) (emphasis in original).
121. Id. at 194-95; see also supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text; infra notes
126-28 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 73-93 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
125. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120 (1982), discussed supra notes 97-101 and accompanying
text.
126. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984) (In reviewing an agency's construction of a statute, a court must first consider
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"); see also Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860, 2867 (1986) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) ("if Congress has clearly expressed an intent contrary to that
of the Agency, [the court's] duty is to enforce the will of Congress") (citing Chevron,
467 U.S. 837); Plater, supra note 1, at 583-92.
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If a court were to balance the

equities, it would usurp the agencies' role under ANILCA, and
thereby frustrate the congressional mandate. This would, as one 128
court

has explained, "render impotent the procedural requirements"'

of

the statute, and Congress cannot be presumed to enact purposeless
legislation. 129 Hence, Congress' mandate in ANILCA is no less compelling than that in ESA.
Although ANILCA and ESA are similar in areas that the Court
considered important in Hill, ANILCA is procedural whereas ESA is
substantive. This distinction, however, should not change the result
suggested by the above mentioned similarities. In Hill, the majority
emphasized ESA's substantive nature to overcome Justice Powell's
dissent in which he relied on decisions under NEPA to assert that
ESA should not be applied retroactively. The majority reasoned that
"it would make sense to hold NEPA inapplicable at some point in the
life of a project, because the agency would no longer have a meaningful opportunity to weigh the benefits of the project versus the detrimental effects on the environment."' 130 Thus, it can be inferred from
this language that, at least in the early stages of a project, the failure to
follow NEPA procedures, or those of a similar statute such as
ANILCA, should be considered similar to a violation of ESA and
should therefore severely restrict the courts' equitable discretion to
grant or deny injunctive relief. '3'
127. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)); accord
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 555, 558 (1978).
128. Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1972), discussed infra notes
209-11 and accompanying text.
129. See, eg., United States v. Powers, 307 U.S. 214, 217 (1939) ("There is a presumption against a construction which would render a statute ineffective or inefficient,
or which would cause grave public injury or even inconveniences.") (quoting Bird v.
United States, 187 U.S. 118, 124 (1902)); cf United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (where statutory language is clear, the courts have
"historically assumed that Congress intended what it enacted").
130. Hill, 437 U.S. at 188 n.34 (emphasis in original).
131. The Court's decisions concerning NEPA further support this inference. In
Kleppe, in rejecting the court of appeals' theory that the "contemplation of regional
action would permit a court to require preproposal preparation of an impact statement," 427 U.S. at 406-07, the Court explained:
The procedural duty imposed upon agencies by [NEPA section 102(2)(C)] is
quite precise. A court has no authority to depart from the statutory language and, by a balancing of court-devised factors, determine a point during
the germination process of a potential proposal at which an impact statement should be prepared. Such an assertion ofjudicial authority would leave
the agencies uncertain as to their procedural duties under NEPA, would
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131

Based on the above analysis, it is evident that ANILCA, unlike
the FWPCA and similar to ESA, should be construed to restrict severely the courts' ability to invoke their equitable discretion to grant
or deny preliminary injunctions. This, however, only takes the analysis halfway. Unfortunately, Hill does not provide guidance as to how
the lower federal courts should apply their remaining equitable powers. Hence, the question remains as to what extent the courts' discretion is limited and the traditional equitable test is rejected or modified.
Through an analysis of the lower federal courts' struggle with this dilemma in the context of preliminary-injunction litigation under section
102(2)(C) of NEPA, the final section of this note will offer a solution.
V. PRACTICAL

EFFECT ON THE COURTS' DISCRETION

The lower federal courts, in their decisions involving violations of
section 102(2)(C) of NEPA,13 2 have struggled with the impact of a
invite judicial involvement in the day-to-day decisionmaking process of the
agencies, and would invite litigation.
Id. at 406 (emphasis in original). Although the Court was not addressing the issue of
whether it is appropriate for a court to balance the equities in deciding whether to
grant or deny injunctive relief, that question is analogous to the issue in Kleppe. Both
inquiries require the court to determine the scope and nature of the project and its
potential environmental impacts, to balance the various interests involved, and to substitute its judgment for that of the agency if the court determines that a preproposal is
required or that an injunction should be granted. If a court, after balancing the equities under the traditional four-factor test, determines that an injunction is warranted,
it has "substituted its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions"-an undertaking the Kleppe Court considered impermissible in
light of the nature of NEPA. Id. at 410 n.21, quoted in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 555 (1978).
132. NEPA section 102(2)(C) provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible...
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-....
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and comments and views of the
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procedural statute on their discretion to grant or deny injunctive re-

lief.133 The decisions are far from uniform. In fact, as Professor Rodgers observes, "[pirecedents for just about every point of view can be

invoked by courts fashioning equitable relief to correct NEPA violations."134 Nevertheless, the decisions are useful because, viewed prop-

erly, they suggest that when confronted with an alleged violation of a
procedural statute, such as section 810 of ANILCA or section
102(2)(C) of NEPA, the federal courts in determining whether to
grant or deny a preliminary injunction should employ the following
three-factor test. First, probable success on the merits should be established by demonstrating the probable substantial violation of the
statute's nondiscretionary procedures - procedures that are not
merely secondary, but are the essence of the statute. Second, irreparable harm should not depend on a showing that the plaintiff is actually
harmed (for example, that subsistence uses (ANILCA) or the environment (NEPA) will be irreparably harmed); instead, irreparable harm

should lie in the procedural harm, that is, in the failure to comply with
the rural participation requirements of section 810 of ANILCA or failure to prepare an adequate EIS under section 102(2)(C) of NEPA.
Third, public interest should not be left to the determination of the
court, but should be regarded as defined by the statute and therefore
embodied in its procedural requirements. Hence, upon a showing of a
appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the
President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through
the existing agency review processes ....
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
133. These decisions, discussed infra notes 135-224 and accompanying text, are
probative because NEPA is similar to ANILCA in that it imposes on the agencies
nondiscretionary, procedural duties that are the essence of the statute. As the Court
explained in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409-10 (1976), "[s]ection 102(2)(C)
is one of the 'action forcing' provisions intended as a directive to 'all agencies to assure
consideration of the environmental impact of their actions in decisionmaking.'" Id.
at 409 (quoting 115 CONG. Rxc. 40,416 (1969) (Senator Jackson's remarks concerning
S.1075 as passed and H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2767)). In Andrus v. Sierra Club, the Court
further elaborated: "[t]he thrust of [section] 102(2)(C) is... that environmental concerns be integrated into the very process of agency decision-making.... If environmental concerns are not interwoven into the fabric of agency planning, the 'action
forcing' characteristics of [section] 102(2)(C) would be lost." 442 U.S. 347, 350-51
(1979); accordWeinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454
U.S. 139, 142-43 (1981); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1977) ("NEPA does set forth significant
substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural"); Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 422 U.S. 289, 319 (1975).

134. W.

RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

798 (1977).
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probable violation of a procedural statute, a rebuttable presumption of
injunctive relief should arise. This presumption may be defeated, and
balancing of the traditional equities thereby made appropriate, by

showing that unusual circumstances exist. Unusual circumstances are
present when there is a strong competing public interest that would be
harmed by the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Furthermore, the
presumption may be defeated and preliminary injunctive relief thereby

denied if the violation is technical rather than substantial, or the issuance of injunctive relief is unnecessary to ensure procedural
compliance.
As will be demonstrated, the majority of the circuits, considering
those decisions that are based on a review of the language, history, and
purpose of the statute involved as Romero-Barcelo requires, recognize
the existence of a rebuttable presumption of injunctive relief for a substantial procedural violation of NEPA section 102(2)(C).135 This presumption is founded on the understanding that the irreparable harm

associated with a substantial procedural violation of section 102(2)(C)
135. Regarding the relevant decisions of the various circuits, see infra notes 136224 and accompanying text.
A number of circuits, however, appear to embrace the position that NEPA does
not alter the courts' ability to invoke the traditional equitable test in determining
whether to grant or deny preliminary injunctive relief. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Canal Authority v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974), concluded that
"NEPA, though relevant to the merits of the present case, has not altered the traditional tests for a preliminary injunction." Id. at 578. But see Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013
(5th Cir. 1971) (court granted injunction without balancing the equities), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 933 (1972). Furthermore, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651
F.2d 983, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1981), the court acknowledged that an injunction is often
appropriate and that the remedy should further the objectives of the statute. Relying
on Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978), discussed infra notes 170-79 and
accompanying text, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Western Oil & Gas
Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978), it explained that "[t]he court should tailor its
relief to fit each particular case, balancing the environmental concerns of NEPA
against the larger interests of society that might be adversely affected by an overly
broad injunction." Marsh, 651 F.2d at 1006. Hence, this case can be interpreted to
invoke a rule, which acknowledges a presumption of injunctive relief, similar to that
applied by the D.C. Circuit in Andrus.
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits also balance the equities when confronted with
a violation or probable violation of NEPA section 102(2)(C). See National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 770, 786 (1lth Cir. 1983); Manatee County v. Gorsuch,
554 F. Supp. 778, 794-96 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. Fla.
1972); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan.) (court issued
injunctive relief after invoking the traditional balancing test), aff'd, 455 F.2d 650
(10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
Finally, the Eighth Circuit also balances equities in deciding whether to grant
injunctive relief for a violation or probable violation of NEPA section 102(2)(C). See,
e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1323 (8th Cir.
1974) (affirming district court's decision to issue injunctive relief after balancing the
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is the failure to comply with the decisionmaking process mandated,
rather than the underlying

harm or potential harm to the

environment.
A. Ninth Circuit
In deciding whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction for

a procedural violation of a statute, the Ninth Circuit invokes the following rule: upon a showing of a probable "substantial procedural
violation," 1 36 irreparable harm is presumed. Absent a showing of
"unusual circumstances," which have been held to include ongoing,
long-term contracts statutorily-mandated, 13 7 and situations where injunctive relief would endanger the environment, 13 8 injunctive relief is
substantive equities). The court, however, in an earlier decision, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehike, 477 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1973), recognized that a NEPA
violation "may constitute a sufficient demonstration of irreparable harm to entitle a
plaintiff to blanket injunctive relief." Id. at 1037. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the
district court's decision to deny issuing a blanket injunction because, after balancing
the substantive equities, the district court concluded that only limited injunctive relief
was appropriate. Id. This case can be classified as one involving "unusual circumstances," therefore warranting balancing. It involved both long-term contracts and a
project for which significant resources had been committed prior to the passage of
NEPA and initiation of the suit. The project found to violate NEPA was authorized
15 years prior to NEPA's enactment, and $75 million had been spent prior to the filing
of the action. Id. at 1035.
136. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985), cited in Village of
Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985) (GambellI1), cert. grantedsub
nom. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986).
137. See Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1985)
("ongoing 20-year contracts, most of which [were] in the third year of their term,"
and which were entered into pursuant to a statutory mandate, which reflected an urgency to prevent customer struggle over a finite power supply, constituted an "unusual case"), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3293 (1986).
138. The Ninth Circuit has invoked this "unusual circumstances" category on two
occasions. First, in Alpine Lakes Protection Society v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089 (9th
Cir. 1975), the court found that enjoining the removal of insect-infested trees for the
failure of the Forest Service to prepare an adequate EIS prior to granting a timber
easement would endanger the surrounding trees and the adjacent national forest lands.
The court therefore found that:
the unusual circumstances of this case call for an individual weighing of the
equities according to the traditional three-factor test: (1) Are the moving
parties likely to prevail on the merits? (2) Does the balance of irreparable
damage favor the issuance of the injunctions? and (3) Does the public interest support granting the injunction?
Id. at 1090. The court, after balancing the equities, denied injunctive relief.
Second, in American Motorcyclist Association v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962 (9th Cir.
1983), the court, despite assuming the existence of a probable NEPA violation, affirmed the district court's refusal to enjoin the implementation of the Bureau of Land
Management's Management Plan. The court found that "enjoining the plan would
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135

issued.139 If unusual circumstances exist, the court decides whether
injunctive relief should be issued pursuant to the traditional equitable
balancing test. The court denies injunctive relief when the procedural
violation is merely technical. 140
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first confronted the issue of
whether and to what extent procedural statutes affect the courts'
power to invoke the traditional test for issuance of preliminary injunctions for a probable violation thereof in Lathan v. Volpe. 141 In that
case, the district court had denied issuance of the preliminary injunction requested as relief for a probable violation of section 102(2)(C) of
NEPA, because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that such relief
was warranted under the traditional test.14 2 The appellate court disagreed with this result. Relying on United States v. City and County of
San Francisco,143 it concluded that a failure to comply with NEPA's
procedural requirements presented a rare case in which immediate
preliminary relief was required. Otherwise, any relief to which the
movants might have been entitled would likely have been worthless to
them when ultimately obtained. 144 Hence, the court issued a preliminary injunction without balancing the equities. The Lathan court
leave fragile desert resources vulnerable to permanent damage from increased recreational use, a harm which Congress expressly intended to prevent." Id. at 966. It therefore determined that "[t]his danger of harm is the kind of unusual circumstance which
...
calls for the 'individualized weighing' of the equities." Id. Upon balancing the
equities the court found that the public interest warranted denial of a preliminary
injunction. Id. at 967. In support of its decision, the court clarified the Ninth Circuit's unusual circumstances category exception. It explained that:
There are.., cases where public concerns other than failure to comply with
NEPA must be weighed in determining whether to grant an injunction....
Alpine... authorizes the court not only to weigh the relative hardship
and harms to the parties, but to examine how the greater public interest may
be affected in the unusual case where enjoining government action allegedly
in violation of NEPA might actually jeopardize natural resources.
Id. at 966. In other words, courts will find "unusual circumstances" to involve strong
competing public interests that would be harmed if injunctive relief was granted.
139. See, e.g., Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1985)
(Gambell II), cert. granted sub nom. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 106 S.
Ct. 2274 (1986); Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 1984);
American MotorcyclistAss'n, 714 F.2d at 965-66.
140. See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980).
In Gribble, the court found that the Corps of Engineers failed to obtain written comments from the U.S. Geological Survey ("USGS") and, therefore, violated NEPA. Id.
at 1022. Nevertheless, the court denied injunctive relief because prior to publishing
the supplement to the final EIS, the Corps made a good-faith effort to secure comments, and subsequent to the district court's decision, the Corps corrected the deficiency vis-A-vis the USGS. Id. at 1022, 1025.
141. 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971).
142. Id. at 1116.
143. 310 U.S. 16 (1940), discussed supra note 28.
144. Lathan, 455 F.2d at 1116-17.
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failed to enunciate a test that courts could employ when confronted
with a violation of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA or similar provisions in
other acts. The courts, however, quickly adopted as the operative rule
the presumption favoring issuance of a preliminary injunction upon
the showing of a probable violation except when unusual circumstances exist. 145 The rationale underlying this rule, however, was not
explicitly articulated until California v. Bergland,14 6 wherein the district court stated:
The rationale for this NEPA injunction rule is clear. NEPA represents a declared Congressional policy requiring assessment of environmental concerns. As such, Congress has weighed the equities
and determined that failure to examine environmental issues represents irreparable injury. If having established a violation of NEPA,
plaintiffs are not allowed to enjoin further activities until the agency
complies1 47with NEPA, then NEPA would be an "exercise in
futility."'

In Thomas v. Peterson,14 the Ninth Circuit extended its rule to
cases arising under one of the procedural provisions of ESA.149 Upon
determining that the procedural requirements of ESA resemble those
of NEPA, the court found that "a failure to prepare a biological assessment is comparable to a failure to prepare an [EIS]."' 5 0 In language similar to that of the Bergland court, the court stated that "if a
project [were] allowed to proceed without substantial compliance with
those procedural requirements, there could be no assurance that a violation of the ESA's substantive provisions [would] not result. The latter, of course, is impermissible."' 15 1
B.

District of Columbia Circuit

The District of Columbia Circuit recognizes that "[iun most cases,
...it is possible and reasonable for the courts to insist on strict compliance with NEPA, and actions can, consistently with the public interest, be enjoined until such compliance is forthcoming."' 152 Thus,
145. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975); Alpine Lakes Protection Soc'y v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975).
146. 483 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, both on

other grounds, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
147. Id. at 498-99 (quoting Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498
F.2d 1314, 1323 (8th Cir. 1974)) (citations omitted).
148. 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (1982).
150. Thomas, 753 F.2d at 764.
151. Id.
152. Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1974)),
vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Alaska, 439

U.S. 922 (1978).
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"there is, in cases of NEPA noncompliance, a 'presumption' in favor
of injunctive relief." 153 But, the circuit further acknowledges that:
[s]uch relief does not follow automatically from every finding of a
violation of NEPA. Rather, where courts have enjoined ongoing
projects, they have done so primarily to preserve for the relevant
decisionmaker the full opportunity to choose among alternatives
that is contemplated by NEPA.... What is called for, in each case,
is a "particularized analysis" of the violations that have occurred, of
the possibilities for
relief, and of any countervailing considerations
15 4
of public interest.
Although this language suggests that the D.C. Circuit employs a
slightly different exception to the presumption of a preliminary injunction than that applied by the Ninth Circuit, 15 5 the difference is merely
semantic. The two circuits have applied their tests similarly. The
D.C. Circuit recognizes three general exceptions to the presumption of
injunctive relief for a procedural violation. First, as does the Ninth
Circuit, the D.C. Circuit recognizes an exception if the violation is
merely technical. Second, both circuits deny injunctive relief where
strong countervailing public interests are present. Finally, the D.C.
Circuit acknowledges an exception where injunctive relief is unnecessary to ensure procedural compliance. This exception, although not
presently acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit, does not undermine the
rule, and it is easily explained-the Ninth Circuit has not had the op156
portunity to decide such a case.

First, several decisions by the D.C. Circuit are similar to Warm
Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble157 in that they involved violations
that were merely technical; therefore, injunctive relief was not warranted. For example, in Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd,158 failure to
file a timely EIS with Congress constituted the NEPA violation. The
153. Id. (quoting Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 456 (D.C. Cir.
1977) ("Ordinarily, when an action is being undertaken in violation of NEPA, there is
a presumption that injunctive relief should be granted.").
154. Id.
155. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted this difference:
[T]he D.C. Circuit apparently does not follow the Ninth Circuit rule that
injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy for a violation of an environmental statute absent rare or unusual circumstances.... Instead, the D.C. Circuit followed [in Andrus] a rule which restricts the availability of an
injunction against an ongoing project to cases where it is necessary primarily
"to preserve for the relevant decisionmaker the full opportunity to choose
among alternatives that is contemplated by NEPA."
GambellII, 774 F.2d 1414, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1985) (quotingAndrus, 580 F.2d at 485)
(citations omitted), cert. grantedsub nom Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell,
106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986).
156. See infra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
157. 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980), discussed supra note 140.
158. 564 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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final EIS, however, was fied prior to beginning construction. Hence,
although the congressional committees approved the project prior to
the completion of the EIS, they had adequate opportunity to react subsequent to the filing of the EIS and prior to the initiation of construction. 159 In ConcernedAbout Trident v. Rumsfeld, 160 the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals refused to grant a preliminary injunction where the
Navy's violation of NEPA was only partial and it had made a goodfaith effort to comply. 16 1 Finally, in Jones v. Districtof Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 162 the court denied injunctive relief because
the violation was merely one of the "statements' timing;" the "defendants' remedial actions achieved the substance of NEPA's requirements
163
and purposes."
Second, both circuits deny preliminary injunctions when strong
countervailing public interests are involved. In NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRDC), 164 the Energy Research and Development Administration
violated section 102(2)(C) of NEPA by failing to consider design and
safety features that could be built into the planned high-level radioactive waste storage tanks. 165 Nevertheless, the court declined to enjoin
construction of the tanks. It reasoned that injunctive relief was unwarranted because such relief would not serve the public interest.
The tanks involved were needed to replace existing tanks from which
wastes were leaking. 166 NRDC is similar to those cases of the Ninth
Circuit in which unusual circumstances required balancing of the equities and subsequent denial of injunctive relief, because such relief
presented a serious environmental harm. 167 Furthermore, the court
explained that "[i]t may still be possible, upon completion of an adequate EIS, for the agency to decide that it is appropriate to modify the
tanks." 168 Hence, injunctive relief, as in Alaska v. Andrus, 169 was unnecessary to ensure procedural compliance with NEPA section
102(2)(C).
The most troubling case for the argument that the tests employed
by the two circuits are analogous is Andrus, particularly since the
159. Id. at 456-58.
160. 555 F.2d 817 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
161. Id. at 830.
162. 499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
163. Id. at 513-14.
164. 606 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
165. Id. at 1272.
166. Id. at 1272-73.
167. See American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983), discussed supra note 138; Alpine Lakes Protection Soc'y v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089 (9th
Cir. 1975), discussed supra note 138.
168. NRDC, 606 F.2d at 1272.
169. 580 F.2d 465, 485 (1978).
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declared it to be "contrary to the law
of this circuit."' 170 Closer analysis, however, reveals that the Ninth
Circuit overreacted and that the difference can be attributed to the fact
that it has not had the opportunity to decide such a case. In Andrus,
the court found two violations of NEPA section 102(2)(C). First, the
Secretary of Interior failed to consider "the possibility of conducting
the lease sale pursuant to different more rigorous operating orders
than those promulgated by the USGS."' 17 1 The court denied injunctive relief because this violation was merely partial and a lesser remedy
would suffice. It reasoned that because operating orders can be
changed subsequent to a lease sale and made retroactive, it was unnecessary to set the lease sales aside. 1 72 Instead, al that was required was
for the Secretary to consider the orders and to change them if he concluded that modification was necessary. 73 Furthermore, the court explained that "[a]ny damage that may have resulted from the
exploration that has already been conducted pursuant to the existing
orders could not, in any event, be remedied by an injunction."' 174 Sec75
ond, the Secretary failed to include termination clauses in the leases.1
Again the court denied injunctive relief. Here it did so because the
violation was merely partial, countervailing public interests were present, and "[i]f it should eventually develop that the exploration would
produce environmental damage that cannot be avoided by modification of the operating orders, or by a suspension of operations, the government would . . . retain the power to institute formal eminent
76
domain proceedings at that time, to take the leasehold interests."'
In short, although the Andrus court found that the violations of
NEPA were not merely technical, injunctive relief was unnecessary.
Enjoining the lease sales was not necessary to preserve the Secretary's
opportunity to choose among the alternatives in an informed manner,
as required by section 102(2)(C) of NEPA. 1 77 The Ninth Circuit's test
does not provide for such an exception, 17 8 but the Ninth Circuit has
not been confronted with a case similar to Andrus, and therefore it has
not had the occasion to create such an exception. And, as discussed
earlier, Hill and Romero-Barcelo appear to mandate the presence of
170. Gambell II, 774 F.2d 1414, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Andrus, 580 F.2d at
485) (citations omitted), cerL granted sub nom. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of
Gambell, 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986).
171. Andrus, 580 F.2d at 485.
172. Id. at 485-86.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 486.
175. Id. at 485.
176. Id. at 486-87.
177. Id. at 485.
178. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
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such an exception. 179 Consequently, Andrus is not contrary to the law
of the Ninth Circuit; in fact, its holding constitutes a necessary exception to the presumption of injunctive relief for a violation of section

102(2)(C) of NEPA.
C. First Circuit
The First Circuit's position concerning NEPA's effect on the
courts' power to balance the underlying equities is illustrated in Massachusetts v. Watt.18 0 In affirming the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with the
Secretary that the "propriety of a preliminary injunction depends" on
the results of balancing under the four-factor test. 18 1 The court, however, disagreed with the Secretary's assertion that the plaintiffs had
failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. In Watt, the plaintiffs sought
to enjoin certain lease sales by the Secretary for oil exploration. In
response the Secretary argued that the lease sales did not entitle the
buyers to drill for oil and that several additional steps requiring government approval were necessary before the purchasers could begin
drilling. Therefore, the Secretary contended that the court should
have allowed the lease sales to proceed while it considered their lawfulness. The Secretary also noted that the court could always set aside
182
the lease sales if it concluded that they were unlawful.
The court, however, found that failure, or probable failure, to
comply with NEPA's procedural mandate 8 3 constituted a showing of
both probable success on the merits and irreparable harm. 184 In so
holding, the court explained that because "[ilt is far easier to influence
an initial choice than to change a mind already made up[,]... a plaintiff seeking an injunction cannot be stopped at the threshold by [the
government's] pointing to additional steps between the governmental
decision and [underlying, or substantive,] environmental harm."' 185 In
affirming the district court's issuance of injunctive relief, the court also
found that: (1) the plaintiff's procedural harm, if injunctive relief was
denied, outweighed the Secretary's harm if relief was granted; and (2)
the public interest would be best served if the injunction was
179. See supra pp. 110-14. It is for this reason that such an exception is included in
the standard proposed herein for determining when to grant preliminary injunctions
for substantial violations of statutes that are procedural in nature. See supra p. 126.
180. 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983).
181. Id. at 951.
182. Id. at 951-52.
183. The court distinguished NEPA from the FWPCA - a substantive environmental statute - and therefore distinguished Romero-Barcelo. Id. at 952.
184. Id. at 951-53.
185. Id. at 952 (emphasis in original).
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granted. 18 6 The court based its public interest finding on the district
court's analysis in which the district court concluded:
It is plain that the public interest calls upon the courts to require
strict compliance with environmental statutes. Congress has mandated that action ... proceed.., in accordance with several regulatory schemes, [such as NEPA and ESA], that require public
disclosure of and comment on all factors relevant to a balanced,
The plaintiffs have demonreasoned, and informed decision ....
strated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that this
clearly requires
mandate has not been satisfied. The public interest
187
that the Congressional mandate be fulfilled.
Hence, by concluding that a demonstration of a probable NEPA violation constituted a showing of probable success on the merits and irreparable harm, and that the public interest required compliance with
NEPA's procedural requirements, the court in effect applied a rebuttable presumption favoring injunctive relief.
The First Circuit's decision in Jones v. Lynn 188 provides further
support that the circuit invokes a test similar to that of the Ninth Circuit and is, therefore, in accord with the test proposed herein. Upon
analyzing NEPA and its underlying intent, the court determined that
the courts' responsibility is to "protect the integrity of the fact-finding
process mandated by Congress."' 189 The court therefore remanded the
case with instructions that, if the district court determined that the
government's activities constituted "major federal action," then
NEPA was violated and an injunction should be issued. 190 The court
suggested that balancing the underlying equities in the traditional
sense would be appropriate only for those portions of the project that
were near completion or for which the breach of contractual obligations would "work a substantial injustice or public harm."' 19 1 This
decision demonstrates that the First Circuit, although recognizing a
rebuttable presumption of injunctive relief, acknowledges that an injunction may be inappropriate when its issuance would cause substantial public harm or when the decision-maker's opportunity to make an
informed decision is foreclosed, thereby rendering injunctive relief
moot. These exceptions comport with those employed by the Ninth
Circuit.
186. Id. at 953.
187. Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, 583 (D. Mass.), aff'd
sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983).
188. 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973).
189. Id. at 892.
190. Id. at 892-93.
191. Id. at 893.
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Fourth Circuit

Although the Fourth Circuit clearly departs from the traditional
four-factor test, it is unclear what, if any, systematic balancing test is
used. The courts consider NEPA and its underlying legislative intent,
as required by Hill and Romero-Barcelo,192 and then, upon finding a

violation of NEPA's procedural requirements, issue injunctive relief
without invoking the traditional four-factor test. 19 3 Although these

decisions do not directly support the modified injunctive test proposed, they do support the conclusion that a procedural statute affects
the courts' ability to employ their equitable powers to grant or deny
preliminary injunctions, and that a presumption of injunctive relief ex-

ists where there is either an actual or probable substantial violation of
NEPA section 102(2)(C). The courts in this circuit, however, deny
194
injunctive relief where noncompliance is merely technical.

E.

Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits

Finally, the decisions of the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
concerning the impact of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA on the federal

courts' equitable powers to grant or deny preliminary injunctions are
inconsistent. Generally, however, the cases in which NEPA, its purpose, and its legislative history are analyzed in accord with the factors
deemed significant by Hill and Romero-Barcelo195 hold that NEPA
restricts their discretion in a manner consistent with the modified test
proposed herein. Illustrative of the Second Circuit's authority sup-

porting a presumption for injunctive relief is Sierra Club v. United

States Army Corps of Engineers.19 6 After reviewing NEPA and its
192. See supra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
193. See, eg., Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1332 (4th
Cir.) (in granting injunctive relief without balancing the substantive equities, the court
reasoned that "Section 102(2)(C) is applicable to a project until it has reached the
state of completion where the costs of abandonment or altering the proposed route
would clearly outweigh the benefits therefrom"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972);
cf Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Rankin v. Coleman, 394 F. Supp. 647
(E.D. N.C.) ("acknowledging the requirement of strict compliance with NEPA," the
court found that defendants violated section 102(2)(C) and therefore, without balancing the equities, issued an injunction), modified, 401 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. N.C. 1975).
194. See Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va.) (although
EIS filed by Corps was partially incomplete, court found that it had considered requisite environmental impacts prior to deciding to proceed), aff'd, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir.
1973).
195. See supra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
196. 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Action for Rational Transit v. West
Side Highway Project, 536 F. Supp. 1225, 1252-54 (S.D. N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 699 F.2d
614 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Sierra Club v. United
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983). But in Sierra Club v.
Hennessey, 695 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1982), the court of appeals reversed the district
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purpose,19 7 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
"although NEPA established 'significant substantive goals for the Nation,' the balancing of the substantive environmental issues is consigned to the judgment of the executive agencies involved, and the
judicially reviewable duties that are imposed on the agencies are 'essentially procedural.' "198 It therefore, without balancing the equities,
affirmed the district court's issuance of injunctive relief.199 Several of
the decisions in which the courts employ the traditional balancing test
involve circumstances that arguably fall within the "extraordinary or
unusual" category for which balancing the substantive equities is
appropriate.2 00
In the Sixth Circuit, Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee
Valley Authority20 1 represents the better reasoned authority. 20 2 After
court's issuance of a permanent injunction, because it failed to balance the equities,
which favored the defendants. The appellate court neither discussed NEPA nor its
legislative history. It based the need to balance the equities on Conservation Society
of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Secretary of Transportation, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1974), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975) (a case involving unusual circumstances and thus warranting balancing), which is discussed infra note 200. See
also Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1975) (in granting injunctive relief,
the court balanced the substantive equities).
197. Sierra Club, 701 F.2d at 1029-31.
198. Id. at 1029 (quoting Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,
444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980)).
199. Id. at 1034-35. The district court did not employ the traditional balancing
test to determine that injunctive relief should be issued. Instead, it held that "since
the [Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA")] has failed to comply with NEPA,
the FHWA must be enjoined against making any further steps." Sierra Club v. United
States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 541 F. Supp. 1367, 1370 (S.D. N.Y.), appeal dismissed,
697 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.

1983).

200. See, eg., New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 550 F.2d 745 (2d Cir.
1977) (challenged plutonium transfers ongoing for 25 years), cited in American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1983) (cited for proposition that
the equities should be balanced in cases presenting "unusual circumstances," such as
where the public interest would be harmed if injunctive relief was granted); Conservation Soc'y of S. Vermont, Inc., 508 F.2d at 936-38 (court acknowledged general rule
that injunctive relief is appropriate for statutory violations but reasoned that the equities involved - project in advanced stage of completion, extensive environmental considerations completed, and injunctive relief would severely harm the defendants and
the public - favored denying such relief), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809

(1978).

201. 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
202. This author considers the better reasoned cases to be those in which the courts
base their authority to grant or deny injunctive relief on a careful analysis of NEPA,
its purpose, and its legislative history as required by the Court in Hill and RomeroBarcelo. For an example of a poorer reasoned authority, by the Sixth Circuit, see
Ohio ex rel Brown v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1974) (without analyzing
NEPA, its purpose, or its legislative history, the court rejected the contention that it
could not exercise discretion and therefore should issue a comprehensive injunction

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:105

carefully analyzing NEPA and its legislative history, 20 3 the court affirmed the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction, thereby
rejecting the appellants' contention that the plaintiffs would not suffer
irreparable harm if injunctive relief was denied. The court found, in
addition to the balance of the underlying harms favoring injunctive
relief,20 4 that "the preliminary injunction.., is the vehicle by which a
declared congressional policy can be effectuated. Sufficient irreparable
harm... can be found in the continuing denial by appellants of appellees' [procedural] right under the NEPA, and this is enough to justify
'20 5
issuing the injunction.
Finally, the law of the Seventh Circuit is unclear. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals found in Scherr v. Volpe 20 6 that a substantial
violation of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA was enough to warrant injunctive relief and balancing the equities therefore was unnecessary. In
Wisconsin v. Weinberger,20 7 however, the court, in dictum, explained
that "NEPA does not foreclose the application of traditional principles of injunctive relief."'208 For the reasons stated below, Scherr
should be considered the superior authority of the circuit.
In Scherr, the court was confronted with an appeal from the issuance of an injunction for failure to comply with section 102(2)(C) of
NEPA. The appellants claimed, inter alia, that the injunction was
granted improperly because the appellees had "failed to show that the
construction of Highway 16 would result in irreparable harm to the
environment. ' 20 9 After examining section 102(2)(C) and its legislative
history, the court concluded that "[t]o accept the [appellees'] argument on this point would thwart the Congressional mandate by rendering impotent the procedural requirements of [NEPA. ' 210 The
court, therefore, affirmed the district court's issuance of injunctive relief. It explained:
pursuant to a substantial procedural violation; instead, it applied the traditional equitable test, looking to the underlying substantive harms).
203. EnvironmentalDefense Fund, 468 F.2d at 1172-81. The court concluded that
section 102(2)(C) of NEPA imposes procedural requirements that are not discretionary; rather, it establishes a "strict standard of compliance." Id. at 1174 (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). The court, therefore, found that federal agencies must
comply with NEPA's procedural requirements prior to engaging in action covered by
the statute, unless a competing statute precludes compliance. Id. at 1176.
204. Id. at 1183-84.
205. Id. at 1184.
206. 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
207. 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984).
208. Id. at 426.
209. Scherr, 466 F.2d at 1034.
210. Id.
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The kind of "irreparable harm" which must be shown in order to
justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction in these cases can be
found in the language of the Act itself .... "Section 102 of NEPA
mandates a particular sort of careful and informed decision-making
process and creates judicially enforceable duties." Here, if the project were allowed to proceed after the [appellees] had demonstrated
a probability of success on the merits, this "careful
2 11 and informed
decision-making process" would be lost forever.
In Weinbergerthe district court had enjoined the Navy from continuing work on Project ELF, because the Navy had failed to prepare
a supplemental environmental impact statement. The district court
found NEPA to be similar to ESA and therefore, following Hill and
distinguishing Romero-Barcelo, it concluded:
In much the same way that [Congress] has chosen to preserve endangered species, Congress has chosen to impose a decisionmaking
process on federal agencies by enacting [NEPAl. The Act is
designed to ensure that environmental concerns are integrated into
the process of agency decision-making and that the public is inof the environmental conseformed of the agency's 2consideration
12
quences of its decisions.
Thus, because the Navy had failed to "overcome the presumption that
an injunction is necessary, '2 13 the district court refused to balance the
equities and granted injunctive relief. It explained that "[t]his presumption may be overcome if an injunction would not serve the purposes of the Act by preserving the freedom of choice for the agency
after it considers possible adverse environmental consequences of its
options."214
The court of appeals held that the Navy did not violate NEPA,
and therefore vacated the injunction. 2 15 In dictum, however, the court
opined that "even if there had been a NEPA violation, the district
court abused its discretion in not undertaking a balancing of the relative harms to the parties before entering the injunction. ' 21 6 The court
based its opinion on several factors. First, it concluded that NEPA
and ESA are dissimilar. 21 7 It reasoned:
NEPA ... is procedural in nature .... and the statute recognizes
that agencies may decide to subordinate environmental values to
211. Id. (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
212. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 582 F. Supp. 1489, 1494 (W.D. Wis.) (citing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S. 139, 142-43
(1981), rev'd, 736 F.2d 438 (7th Cir.) (order only), later opinion, 745 F.2d 412 (7th

Cir. 1984)).
213. Id. at 1495.

214. Id.
215. Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 424.

216. Id.
217. Id. at 426.
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other social values with which they sometimes compete. Thus,
although the judicial role is to insure that this weighing of competing interests takes place, we must fulfill this role in accordance with
a consideration of other social costs, as recognized by the statute
itself. That,
after all, is the traditional way of applying equitable
2 18
principles.

The court's reasoning is flawed because it confuses the agencies' procedural and substantive responsibilities under NEPA. Under this reasoning the court concludes that, because Congress authorized the
agencies to balance environmental and nonenvironmental considerations, the courts retain their ability to balance the equities. The court
fails to recognize that, although Congress authorized the agencies to
invoke their discretion to approve or deny major federal actions, this
2 19
discretion does not apply to NEPA's procedural requirements.
Hence, the fact that agencies "may subordinate environmental values
to other social values" 220 after they comply with the nondiscretionary
procedural requirements of section 102(2)(C) does not in turn authorize the courts to balance the equities, unfettered, when an agency violates section 102(2)(C).
Second, the court based its conclusion that balancing the substantive equities was appropriate on its view of "[tihe recent trend of the
majority of the courts, 2 2 1 which it believed "is to evaluate competing
public interests in fashioning permanent injunctive relief for NEPA
violations. ' 22 2 The court supports this assertion by citing four decisions from the Second, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits, the most recent of
which was decided in 1981.223 These cases, however, do not stand for
the proposition that the courts are free to apply the traditional equitable test, unfettered. Instead, they recognize that a rebuttable presumption for injunctive relief exists for a substantial procedural violation,
but that such relief is inappropriate when strong, competing public
interests are involved, or when such relief is unnecessary to ensure
procedural compliance.
218. Id. (citation omitted).

219. See supra note 133.
220. Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 426.
221. Id.

222. Id.
223. Id. at 426. The court cites Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d
983 (5th Cir. 1981), discussed supra note 135; Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
discussed supra notes 164 and accompanying text; Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465
(D.C. Cir.), discussed supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text, vacated in part on
other grounds sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978);
Conservation Soc'y of S. Vermont, Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., (2d Cir. 1974), discussed supra note 200, vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
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Hence, the factors upon which the Weinberger court based its
conclusion that "NEPA does not foreclose the application of traditional principles of injunctive relief" 224 are not persuasive. Furthermore, the court failed to discuss or distinguish its earlier decision in
Scherr. Thus, although the Seventh Circuit's position is unclear,
Scherr should be considered the circuit's better reasoned authority.
The above analysis of the decisions of the federal circuits demonstrates that, although dissimilarities between the circuits exist, they are
primarily semantic rather than substantive. In those cases in which
the courts base their authority to grant or deny injunctive relief on a
careful analysis of NEPA, its purpose, and its legislative history, the
majority of the circuits recognize that there is a rebuttable presumption of injunctive relief for a substantial procedural violation. The presumption may be defeated and balancing of the substantive equities
appropriate, when strong, countervailing public interests are involved.
Furthermore, the presumption may be overcome and injunctive relief
denied if the violation is merely technical or the issuance of injunctive
relief is unnecessary to ensure procedural compliance.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Amoco presents the United States Supreme Court with the opportunity to decide whether and to what extent section 810 of ANILCA
limits the federal courts' ability to invoke their equitable discretion to
grant or deny a preliminary injunction as relief for a probable substantial procedural violation. If the Court decides this issue, its decision
will not be limited to preliminary-injunction actions under ANILCA
section 810. Instead, the Court's decision will also affect actions involving alleged violations of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA and other
similar procedural statutes.
As this note demonstrates, section 810 of ANILCA imposes on
the federal agencies nondiscretionary, procedural duties that protect
Congress' preference for subsistence uses. Congress' mandate prevents
the courts from balancing the substantive equities to determine
whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction for a probable substantial procedural violation. If the courts were to ignore Congress'
mandate and balance the equities, they would usurp the federal agencies' role and violate the separation of powers doctrine. The tripartite
nature of our federal government forbids such a result.
The existence of a statute such as section 810 of ANILCA, however, does not require the federal courts mechanically to grant a preliminary injunction for every probable substantial procedural
224. Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 426.
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violation. Instead, the courts must recognize the existence of a rebuttable presumption favoring preliminary injunctions. Such relief is
warranted because, if a probable substantial violation is demonstrated,
irreparable harm is established and the public interest, as embodied in
the statute's procedures, will be protected by granting injunctive relief.
Absent unusual circumstances in which a strong competing public interest is involved, the courts should forgo balancing the underlying
merits and grant injunctive relief. Furthermore, they should deny injunctive relief when the violation is merely technical and when such
relief is unnecessary to ensure procedural compliance.
A majority of the circuits, in their better reasoned decisions, invoke this approach. Although the circuits' use of different language in
the formulation of their rules causes some confusion, it is evident from
their application that these tests are fundamentally similar and support the modified test proposed herein. The Amoco Court should follow their lead, harmonize the preliminary-injunction test, and bring
the minority into line.
Don J. Frost, Jr.
AUTHOR'S POSTSCRIPT

While this note was at the printer, the Supreme Court decided
Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell.225 Contrary to this author's conclusion, the Court found that the procedural requirements 226
of
section 810(a) are subordinate to its underlying substantive policy.
The Court reasoned that "nothing. . .distinguishes Romero-Barcelo
from the instant case."122 7 Therefore, as the Court construed the
FWPCA in Romero-Barcelo,22 8 the Court found that ANILCA does
not restrict the courts' ability to invoke the traditional balancing test
when determining whether to issue injunctive relief for a substantial
225. 55 U.S.L.W. 4355 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1987).
226. Id. at 4359. The Court explained that "[]ike the First Circuit in RomeroBarcelo, the Ninth Circuit erroneously focused on the statutory procedure rather than
on the underlying substantive policy the process was designed to effect-preservation
of subsistence resources." Id.
227. Id. at 4359.
228. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
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procedural violation of section 810(a). 229 The Court held that the balance of the substantive harms and the public interest favored the Secretary and the oil company petitioners; it, therefore, reversed the
230
Ninth Circuit's issuance of injunctive relief.
The Court's conclusion that the underlying substantive policy,
rather than the procedural requirements, of section 810(a) of
ANILCA is determinative and, thus, does not restrict the courts' equitable powers to grant or deny injunctive relief for a violation is peculiar for two reasons. First, it is unnecessary in light of the Court's
decision that ANILCA does not apply to the OCS. 231 Second, the
Court neither cited nor discussed those sections of ANILCA upon
which it relied in reaching this conclusion. This failure is curious,
given the importance of the "language, history, and structure of the
legislation under review" 232 in determining whether the statute affects
the courts' ability to invoke the traditional balancing test for injunctive
relief, and the Court's extensive discussions of the FWPCA and ESA
and their respective legislative histories in Romero-Barcelo2 33 and
Hill.234 Moreover, in another part of the opinion where the Court
decides that ANILCA does not apply to the OCS, the Court carefully
analyzed ANILCA and its legislative history. 235 In its analysis, the
Court emphasized the need to give meaning to the words used by Congress, particularly "[w]hen statutory language is plain, and nothing in
the Act's structure or relationship to other statutes calls into question
this plain meaning. '23 6 Yet, without explanation, the Court, by its
conclusion that section 810 of ANILCA is designed to "protect Alaskan subsistence resources from unnecessary destruction," 237 read out
of the statute the words "opportunity for" 238 and failed to consider the
229. Amoco, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4359. The Court explained that the Ninth Circuit's
presumption favoring injunctive relief "is contrary to traditional equitable principles
and has no basis in ANILCA." Id.
230. Id. at 4359. The Court also went on to hold that ANILCA does not apply to

the OCS. Id.
231. Justices Stevens and Scalia criticize the majority opinion because the finding
that ANILCA does not apply to the OCS rendered a decision concerning the proper
standard of injunctive relief unnecessary. Id. at 4362 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
232. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978); accord Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-19
(1982); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
233. 456 U.S. at 314-20, discussed supra notes 41-50, 73-112 and accompanying
text.
234. 437 U.S. at 171-89, discussed supra notes 33-40, 113-129 and accompanying
text.
235. Amoco, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4360-62.
236. Id. at 4361.
237. Id. at 4359.
238. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevance
of the phrase "opportunity for" and its use in ANILCA.
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importance
of the procedural structure of ANILCA, as analyzed in
239
this note.

The Court's determination that the Ninth Circuit erred in "focus[ing] on the statutory procedure rather than on the underlying sub-

stantive policy the process was designed to effect" 240 and recognizing a
presumption of irreparable harm for the Secretary's failure to comply

with section 810's procedural requirements may have extensive implications. First, because of the structure and importance of ANILCA's

procedural mandate, 241 it is difficult to imagine a statute for which the
nondiscretionary procedures can be construed to be the statute's essence. Nevertheless, the Court's analysis of NEPA in Hill 242 and
Kleppe v. Sierra Club243 may provide a means to distinguish section
102(2)(C) of NEPA from section 810(a) of ANILCA and thereby to
support an argument that NEPA's procedural mandate is not
subordinate to its underlying substantive policy. Second, by determining that the courts must balance the substantive harms when faced

with a substantial procedural violation of section 810(a), the Court
rejected the position that a substantial procedural violation, absent a
harm to the underlying substantive policy, can cause harm for which
injunctive relief is appropriate. 244 If applied to injunction actions for

failure to comply with section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, this aspect of the
decision is significant since the majority of the circuits currently recognize that the harm associated with such a violation is not the harm or
potential harm to the environment, but rather the harm inherent in the
failure to comply with NEPA's procedural mandate. 245 Third,
239. See supra notes 81-111, 122-29, and accompanying text.
240. Amoco, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4359.
241. As analyzed by this author, ANILCA and its legislative history demonstrate
that Congress intended ANILCA's procedural requirements to be mandatory and its
essence. See supra notes 81-111, 122-29, and accompanying text.
242. 437 U.S. 153, 188 n.34 (1978), discussed supra note 130 and accompanying
text.
243. 427 U.S. 390, 406-07, 410 n.21 (1976), discussed supra notes 127, 131, and
accompanying text.
244. In addition to affecting the federal courts' approach to granting or denying
preliminary injunctions for substantial procedural violations of other statutes, such as
NEPA, this facet of the Court's holding may also create a standing hurdle. By finding
that the procedural harm could neither warrant injunctive relief nor even constitute a
factor to be considered in the traditional balancing test, arguably, the Court considered the harm inherent in a substantial procedural violation of section 8 10(a), or similar statute, not to be judicially cognizable. Hence, absent a showing of probable harm
to the underlying substantive policy-subsistence (ANILCA), environment
(NEPA)-a plaintiff lacks standing to challenge an agency's failure to comply with
congressionally mandated, nondiscretionary procedures. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 750-53 (1984) (finding that constitutional, core component of standing is
plaintiff must allege a "judicially cognizable injury").
245. See supra Part V.
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notwithstanding the Secretary's committing a substantial procedural
violation of section 810(a) of ANILCA, the Court held that compliance was unnecessary because the substantive equities favored continued oil exploration. Despite recognizing that "[h]ere as in RomeroBarcelo, compliance could be obtained through the simple means of an
order to the responsible federal official to comply," 24 6 the Court did

not order the Secretary to comply with section 810(a)'s nondiscretionary procedures. The Court asserted that such a holding did not "undermine" 247 the underlying substantive policy of the statute. Its
holding, however, did undermine and render impotent ANILCA's
mandatory procedures. This result permits the courts to ignore Congress' mandate and usurp the federal agencies' role, and, therefore, it
appears to abridge the separation of powers doctrine. 248

246. Amoco, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4359 n.8.
247. Id. at 4359.
248. This holding permits the courts to ignore Congress' procedural mandate to
the agencies engaged in actions affecting subsistence uses and to usurp the agencies'
role under the statute, as defined and mandated by Congress. See supra Part IV. The
Court explained that:
[T]he record before the District Court was complete enough to allow it to
decide that exploration activities would not significantly restrict subsistence
resources. The fact that, on another record, such a conclusion could not be
made with any degree of confidence is a factor to be considered under the
traditional equitable balancing of interests but hardly suggests that the balancing test itself must be abandoned,
Amoco, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4359 n.12. The implications of this dicta, if read broadly, are
that balancing the substantive equities is required when the effects of exploration activities on subsistence uses are unknown or even when it is known that exploration
activities will significantly restrict subsistence. Hence, in light of this dicta and the
Court's holding, it would seem that, despite a finding that exploration activities will
significantly restrict subsistence resources, the court must deny injunctive relief if it
determines that the balance of the equities favors exploration. Furthermore, it need
not order the agency involved to comply with section 810(a)'s procedures. Regardless
of the Court's determination that such a result does not undermine ANILCA's substantive policy, such a result undermines the statutory scheme Congress enacted and
violates the separation of powers doctrine.

